1. Introduction
over the past half-century, Pakistan —as one of the most complex examples of a post-colonial state— has transformed into an arena where conflicting forces intersect within the power structure. In this landscape, neither military dominance alone is decisive, nor does electoral democracy possess the capacity to establish a sustainable order. From this perspective, understanding Pakistan within classical frameworks of democracy or authoritarianism yields an incomplete and reductionist interpretation. What renders the country’s power structure more intelligible is the application of the concept of a “hybrid regime” —a term that gained traction in political science literature after the collapse of the Eastern Bloc in the 1990s to describe regimes situated between democracy and authoritarianism (Levitsky & Way, 2010; Diamond, 2002).
In Pakistan’s political landscape, the internal logic of hybrid power is multi-faceted: the military, bureaucracy, security apparatus, economic elites, and in more recent decades, the urban middle class and emerging media networks; all play integral roles in this complex equation. These actors contribute not only to the redistribution of power but also to its reproduction through both institutional and non-institutional mechanisms—mechanisms that blend limited democratic legitimacy with informal and authoritarian control.
Recent statements by Pakistan’s Defense Minister Khawaja Asif, who openly referred to the "hybrid system" as an effective model for governance, have once again drawn attention to the unconventional nature of power structures in the country. This paper aims to reinterpret Pakistan’s power structure within the framework of a hybrid regime, drawing on credible academic sources and contemporary conceptual models. The goal is to offer a conceptual, institutional, and strategic understanding of Pakistan’s political-institutional condition—particularly for strategic institutions and policy-makers.
2. Theoretical Foundations and Historical Evolution of the Hybrid Regime in Pakistan
2.1. The Hybrid Regime: A Concept Between Democracy and Authoritarianism
The concept of the hybrid regime emerged in the final decades of the 20th century as a theoretical response to phenomena in which regular elections were held, yet key functions of democracy—such as the rule of law, the independence of institutions, and the guarantee of civil rights—remained compromised or constrained. In such structures, "electoral democracy" is combined with "soft authoritarianism", producing a system that is neither fully democratic nor entirely autocratic.
This concept remains one of the most debated in democratic theory and regime studies. It was introduced in the 1990s by scholars such as Larry Diamond, Andreas Schedler, Steven Levitsky, and Lucan Way, who, in response to the traditional binary classification of regimes— “democracy” vs. “authoritarianism”— highlighted the rise of new types of political systems that contain elements of both.
As such, hybrid regime is identified as a form of semi-authoritarian system wherein the formal elements of democracy (such as elections) coexist with authoritarian logics (such as security interventions and restrictions on political freedoms). In these regimes, legitimacy is derived through public vote, but decision-making processes remain under the control of unelected institutional actors.
Thus, the hybrid regime is essentially a product of incomplete transition—situations in which authoritarian legacies have not fully collapsed, nor have democratic institutions gained dominance over the political system. Pakistan stands as a quintessential example of this condition.
2.2. The Gradual Consolidation of the Hybrid Regime in Pakistan (1988–Present)
Since its founding in 1947, Pakistan has been shaped as a state tasked with survival—a state whose very existence has been continually redefined by external threats (especially regarding India) and internal discord (ethnic, sectarian, and regional divides). This security-centric framework has structurally favored military and bureaucratic institutions in shaping the country’s political trajectory.
In its early years, Pakistan was governed not through a constitution, but through the imperative of survival. The first constitution, adopted in 1956, was abrogated just two years later by the military coup of General Ayub Khan. Since then, the military has either directly ruled (1958–1971, 1977–1988, 1999–2008) or informally controlled the levers of power (especially post-2008).
The first key turning point in establishing a hybrid regime was the 1958 coup d’état led by General Mohammad Ayub Khan, which removed then-President Iskander Mirza from power. This event marked the demise of the 1956 Constitution and initiated the era of direct military rule. Ayub Khan attempted to forge a balance among military, bureaucratic, and industrial elites by instituting an authoritarian presidential system.
However, the collapse of this balance—fueled by social and political crises in the 1960s and defeat in the 1965 war with India—paved the way for a second coup. In 1969, General Yahya Khan forced Ayub Khan to resign and assumed complete control (Jalal, A., 1990:49). This transfer of power did not occur through civilian institutions but within the military, underscoring the fact that in Pakistan, the army is not only a stabilizing actor but also the framework of political power transition.
These two coups cemented militarism in Pakistan’s political landscape, establishing a model that has endured—both in the form of direct military rule and in the guise of informal control over civilian institutions (Cohen, 2004:61).
While the regime of General Zia-ul-Haq (1977–1988) represented the pinnacle of ideological authoritarianism, the end of his rule marked the beginning of a new phase: a period in which civilian institutions (parliament, media, political parties) were partially revived but remained under the oversight of security and judicial bodies. From 1988 onward, Pakistan has gradually gravitated toward a model of “electoral authoritarianism”, or the hybrid regime.
Key features of this hybrid regime include:
Regular but Controlled Elections: Military and intelligence apparatuses play a decisive role in shaping party configurations, limiting competitors, and engineering electoral outcomes.
Non-Independent Judiciary: The judiciary often serves the interests of military-political elites. It plays a dual role; at times acting as a tool for eliminating dissenters, and at others functioning as a legitimizing force for the hybrid system. Judicial rulings in politically sensitive cases frequently align with the interests of the army or ruling coalition. Thus, the judiciary has also become part of the political control puzzle.
Elected Institutions with Limited Authority: The parliament, cabinet, and even the prime minister possesses minimal real power in comparison to the military and intelligence institutions.
Active Yet Containable Civil Society: Despite the rise of social media and an urban middle class, the state utilizes tools such as censorship, security pressure, and counter-terrorism laws to suppress critical voices and constrain civil activism (BTI 2024; Freedom House, 2023).
Furthermore, the role of the military in consolidating Pakistan’s hybrid regime extends far beyond direct coups. As Ayesha Siddiqa (2007) illustrates in her seminal work Military Inc., the Pakistan Army is not merely a security institution but a political, economic, and ideological actor. Through a network of economic foundations such as the Fauji Foundation, the Army Welfare Trust, affiliated media outlets, and influence over higher education, the military has succeeded in creating a hybrid order of security-based authority and social legitimacy.
Thus, the military is structurally involved in the management of democratic processes through the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), controlling of political parties, engineering of public opinion, and shaping of foreign policy. This structural presence ensures the reproduction of military authority without necessarily resorting to direct intervention.
Consequently, based on comparative models and historical trend analysis, Pakistan can be considered a stable example of a hybrid regime, in which unelected actors (military forces, intelligence agencies, and religious institutions) manage, control, and sometimes undermine formal democratic structures. In the Meanwhile, maintaining a façade of elections and public participation is seen as essential for legitimization. This model is not simply the result of weak democratic institutions, but a product of an internal equilibrium of interests among various power groups that has solidified over time.
However, the emergence of a new middle class, the proliferation of digital media, and mounting international pressures have increasingly destabilized this equilibrium, necessitating a reassessment of the dynamics within Pakistan’s hybrid regime for strategic analysts.
Over the past decade—particularly since the rise of Imran Khan to power in 2018—the structure of Pakistan’s hybrid regime has entered a phase of consolidation. The military’s overt and covert support for the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) party played a key role in Khan’s electoral victory. However, as military dissatisfaction grew with Khan’s increasing assertiveness, a collapse of the tacit civil-military alliance occurred in 2022, culminating in the fall of his government. These developments highlighted that within the framework of Pakistan’s hybrid regime, elections, parties, and political leadership remain legitimate only so long as they align with the interests of the military establishment. Otherwise, they are swiftly excluded from power.
Significantly, the hybrid regime is not confined to the realm of political elites but is also institutionalized within structural and bureaucratic institutions. A case in point is the Special Investment Facilitation Council (SIFC), where the military plays a central role in directing economic policy. This organized influence has severely diminished the civilian government’s authority in economic affairs. Moreover, the judiciary functions as another mechanism of control within the hybrid regime. Judicial rulings against opposition figures, widespread disqualification of candidates, and the stripping of political rights from rival party leaders all serve to perpetuate the hybrid model of governance.
From a societal perspective, Pakistan’s hybrid regime maintains control over the public sphere through the suppression of independent media and the cultivation of an atmosphere of fear targeting journalists and civil society actors. Despite the apparent existence of private media and the apparent vibrancy of political parties, a form of “engineered freedom” has taken root—one in which any criticism of the military, government, or intelligence agencies can have serious consequences. This has created a political paradox: on the one hand, Pakistan retains a superficial democratic structure and is internationally recognized as a republic; on the other hand, genuine political activity is only possible within the informal boundaries set by extra-constitutional forces.
3. Probable Future Scenarios for the Hybrid Regime in Pakistan
3.1 Continuity of the Hybrid Regime in a Renewed Form: Durability through Adaptability
A deeper examination of the logic underpinning the survival of Pakistan’s political structure suggests that its hybrid regime — distributed in a unique manner among the military establishment, civilian elites, and bureaucratic oligarchies—possesses a high capacity for self-reproduction amidst changing conditions. This model is based on a logic of “change without transformation,” wherein the military preserves its strategic dominance while temporarily outsourcing executive power to elected parties. This approach not only regenerates the regime’s legitimacy, but also shields the military from direct accountability for governance failures. In this scenario, what is likely to emerge is a superficial recalibration: the military may refrain from direct political involvement and instead adopt a model of conditional, soft support for political actors, as seen during its earlier backing of the PTI.
To ensure its continuity, Pakistan’s hybrid regime has also turned to modern tools, including the use of advanced surveillance technologies, the development of digital monitoring infrastructure, and the launch of soft propaganda campaigns to legitimize its rule. In this model, rather than eliminating all opposition, the regime opts for a form of engineered “limited participation” in which social discontent is managed through controlled local engagement, superficial reforms, and ceremonial elections. Consequently, a weakened civil society and a consumer-oriented middle class gradually disengage from political activism. In such a structure, the existing order persists—despite domestic and international pressures—because its internal logic is rooted in tactical flexibility, networked control, and the maintenance of semi-stability situation.
On the geopolitical front, this scenario benefits from the balance of power among foreign powers—including China, Saudi Arabia, and the United States. Projects such as the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) have enabled the military to position itself as a dominant economic actor, both managing financial resources and consolidating its role in the regional power game. Therefore, despite the crises Pakistan faces, the most likely short-term scenario is the continuation of the hybrid regime —with a modified exterior but an unchanged core.
3.2. Gradual Rupture and Risky Transition Toward a Fragile Democracy
A second possible scenario arises from the same logic of power: a gradual rupture from the hybrid regime and a transition toward a democratic but fragile order. In this trajectory, internal erosion of the military's legitimacy, growing discontent among the middle class, and discursive shifts within political parties may lead to a slow but uncertain transformation. Unlike successful historical transitions, this scenario lacks a strong civil society and deeply rooted democratic institutions capable of institutionalizing the process. However, cumulative pressures—such as chronic economic crises, educated unemployment, and declining public trust in military institutions—may open up new spaces for reformist actors.
In such a fragile transition, some signs of political opening may appear: the media could enjoy slightly more freedom, local elections might become more competitive, and certain oversight institutions may gain relative independence. Nevertheless, the power structure still enjoys informal military interventions through intelligence agencies, security bureaucracies, and budgetary interference. This transition is inherently risky, as it could falter at any moment due to institutional incapacity or emerging security crises, and might even regress to authoritarianism.
Moreover, the role of the international community becomes more prominent in this scenario. Pressures from institutions like the IMF, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), and Western partners for greater transparency, accountability, and reduced military interference in the economy may push domestic elite forces toward limited reforms. Still, many threats remain, including ethnic and ideological polarization, financial instability, and the inability to manage emerging demands. Therefore, while this scenario carries the potential for positive change, it remains highly vulnerable and unstable.
3.3. Turn Toward Institutionalized Authoritarianism: Political Closure and Social Engineering
The third imaginable scenario is a decisive turn of the political system toward entrenched authoritarianism—a situation where the military, abandoning the hybrid game, overtly restructures the political order and replaces it with a centralized, technocratic, and security-oriented regime. This trajectory becomes likely when economic crises, ethnic tensions, and weak civilian governments reach a tipping point, prompting the military to re-enter the scene as the “savior of stability,” but this time under the logic of a modern authoritarian state rather than a traditional military regime.
In such a case, legal structures, civil institutions, and media tools are completely engineered to stabilize a new order in which political control, social control, and grievance management operate systemically. The educational system is transformed into a vehicle for reproducing official ideology, the digital sphere is placed under smart surveillance, and political opponents are either co-opted into the official structure or eliminated through fabricated security cases. Political participation is simulated through state-sponsored parties, quasi-civil associations, and theatrical elections. The middle class, in exchange for relative stability and prosperity from economic projects, distances itself from political agency and adopts a kind of “technocratic obedience.” Regionally, Pakistan increasingly aligns with Eastern authoritarian blocs, particularly China and the Arab Persian Gulf states, reinforcing the emergence of a closed regime.
Although such a scenario might result in institutional cohesion and efficient crisis management in the short term, it is likely to face long-term challenges such as legitimacy deficits, suppression of social creativity, elite brain drain, and heavy dependence on external resources. Historical experience shows that authoritarian turns, while creating surface-level order, are often accompanied by prolonged stagnation and the risk of sudden collapse.
4. Conclusion
The hybrid regime in Pakistan vividly illustrates the complexities of political transitions in the post-authoritarian world—a model that not only conceals its essence by blending democratic and authoritarian elements but also leverages civil institutions to enforce authority, thus creating one of the most resilient forms of semi-authoritarian governance in the modern era.
As a case study, Pakistan clearly demonstrates how institutions such as elections, parliament, and the press can exist while simultaneously serving the consolidation of informal and supra-legal power of actors like the military—without forcing them to restore to overt repression or classical dictatorship. In this context, the most dangerous aspect of a hybrid regime lies not in its overt authoritarianism, but in the gradual institutionalization of democratic devaluation. These regimes simulate participation and competition, creating an illusory sense of freedom, while core decisions are made in limited, unelected, and unaccountable circles.
The result is a steady decline in public legitimacy, erosion of social capital, and eventual disconnection between state and society—a rupture that may lead, in the long run, to structural instability, collapse of official institutions’ legitimacy, or even a return to the outright authoritarianism.
The recent statements of key Pakistani political figures, such as Defense Minister Khawaja Muhammad Asif who has openly referred to the hybrid regime as a “successful model” for governing the country, have several messages. On the one hand, these positions indicate the relative and institutionalized acceptance of this model among the political elites who are dependent on the power structure; and on the other hand, they reveal how the idea of “necessity” is used as a pretext to delay structural reforms under the guise of political realism. On the other end of the spectrum, figures like Maulana Fazl-ur-Rehman openly declare that the hybrid regime is the main cause of the crisis, and military interference in politics is an obstacle to reform and stability. These opposing narratives reflect elite fragmentation and the lack of consensus on a path to reform.
Hence, analyzing the hybrid regime in Pakistan is not merely an examination of a specific country, but rather an exploration of a new model of governance in the 21st century—a model which, if left unchecked, may become the dominant alternative to genuine democracies across the world.
Moreover, analyzing future scenarios for Pakistan’s hybrid regime offers a complex picture of the interplay between domestic forces, power dynamics, and regional and global effects. Among the three outlined scenarios, the most likely short-term one is the persistence of the hybrid regime with superficial changes. However, in the medium- to long-term horizon, the country could either move toward a risky gradual opening, or veer toward complete authoritarian closure.
Ultimately, what will determine Pakistan’s future is not just the structural capacity of the political system, but the agency of elites, the strength of civil society, the intensity of social pressures, and the resilience of formal institutions. In this light, Pakistan remains a living example of the dynamic nature of hybrid regimes in the contemporary world.
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