Introduction

The official recognition of the Taliban government by Russia may mark a new chapter in the international community’s relations with the Taliban and Afghanistan. In fact, this decision by Moscow could pave the way for the official recognition of the Taliban by other countries, particularly neighbors such as Pakistan. However, Pakistan, as one of the most influential countries shaping developments in Afghanistan, has reacted cautiously to this development. Shafqat Ali Khan, the spokesperson for Pakistan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, described it as an issue limited to the bilateral relations of two independent states, based on Moscow’s calculations of its legitimate security interests in this part of the world. His response carried the implication that Pakistan will make decisions on this matter based on the considerations of Islamabad–Kabul bilateral relations and the imperatives of its national interests.

Pakistan’s Considerations for Official Recognition of the Taliban Government

While Pakistan has announced that the issue of officially recognizing the Taliban government is under review and assessment, the significant improvement in bilateral relations in recent months has strengthened positive evaluations in this regard. The visits of Pakistan’s interior and foreign ministers to Kabul, the upcoming visit of Taliban foreign minister Amir Khan Muttaqi to Islamabad, as well as important agreements in security and economic fields, can all be seen as signs of both sides’ determination to improve and elevate their relations. Nevertheless, none of these developments mean that Pakistan will overlook its considerations regarding the official recognition of the Taliban government. These considerations primarily focus on two main axes: domestic considerations; and regional/international considerations.

Domestic Considerations

Given the geographical proximity and deep ties between Pakistan and Afghanistan, the issue of officially recognizing the Taliban is intertwined with Pakistan’s internal considerations in several dimensions:

• Pakistan’s Counterterrorism Challenge:
While cooperation in combating terrorism, particularly the Islamic State of Khorasan Province (ISKP), is cited as one of the main motives for Russia’s recognition of the Taliban government, the nature of this issue for Pakistan is far more complex. Unlike the case of ISKP, which constitutes a common enemy for both Russia and the Taliban, most Pakistani terrorist groups—foremost among them Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)—have a history of close relations and cooperation with the Afghan Taliban. Over recent decades, Pakistan’s perspective on the Taliban’s relations with such groups has seen ups and downs. Specifically regarding the Taliban–TTP connection, several distinct periods can be identified:
First period: From the fall of the Taliban’s first regime and the formation of TTP up to the collapse of the Afghan republic and the Taliban’s return to power. During this time, although the Pakistani government classified TTP as a terrorist group and fought against it, it separated the Afghan Taliban from TTP and effectively ignored the deep ideological and military ties between the two. The result of this approach was that Pakistan ignored warnings about the consequences of supporting the Afghan Taliban, and the potential impact of their return to power on Pakistan’s situation and TTP’s position.

Second period: From the Taliban’s return to power up to the fall of Imran Khan’s government. In this phase, particular attention was given to the Taliban–TTP relationship, with the aim of seeking the Taliban’s help to restrain and stop this terrorist group. The negotiations between Islamabad and TTP, mediated by Kabul, can be explained precisely in this context.
Third period: From Imran Khan’s fall until early this year. Here again, emphasis was placed on the Taliban–TTP link, but this time with a simultaneous political and military pressure on both.

Fourth and current period: Islamabad has once again shifted its approach toward separating the Afghan Taliban from TTP. Within this framework, TTP may be treated as a domestic issue, while relations with the Taliban government could be elevated. Whether this relationship and cooperation can rise to the level of official recognition of the Taliban Emirate remains unclear. However, one might argue that if Islamabad maintains its current approach, the official recognition of the Taliban may not seem far-fetched, regardless of TTP’s situation in Pakistan.

• The Durand Line:
Since Pakistan’s independence, the dispute over the Durand Line between governments in Islamabad and Kabul has remained unresolved. In this regard, many consider Pakistan’s support for Islamist groups such as the Taliban to be linked to its broader efforts to secure the official recognition of the Durand Line. However, like their predecessors, the Taliban have not only refused to officially recognize the Durand Line but, by supporting their Pashtun counterparts across the border, have created additional problems for Islamabad.

• This raises a question: Can Pakistan link the official recognition of the Taliban Emirate to Kabul’s recognition of the Durand Line? Theoretically, such a deal may seem possible and effective at first glance. Yet, considering the Taliban’s positions and the ethnic character of their rule, which emphasizes the unity of Pashtuns on both sides of the Durand, it is inconceivable that the Taliban would accept the official recognition of the Durand Line in exchange for Pakistan’s recognition of their government. What seems more likely is that the Taliban will continue the ambiguous approach of previous Afghan governments—de facto acknowledgment of the line while occasionally using it as a tool of pressure against Pakistan.
Islamabad, aware of this, has shifted its policies from exerting pressure on Afghan governments toward strengthening the Durand border in practice. The abolition of the autonomy of the Pashtun tribal areas (FATA), the mass expulsion of Afghan migrants—mostly Pashtuns—who had lived in Pakistan for decades, and finally the fencing of the border, are all steps Pakistan has taken in recent years to concretize the Durand Line and to build a distinct identity for Pashtuns in its tribal areas.
Thus, it can be said that there is currently no deep link between Pakistan’s recognition of the Taliban government and Kabul’s recognition of the Durand Line.

• Economic Considerations:
Economic factors in Pakistan’s recognition of the Taliban are complex. Since the Taliban’s return to power, Pakistan has repeatedly used economic tools to pressure Kabul. Frequent border closures and stricter conditions for trade and movement of merchants were part of Islamabad’s punitive “stick policy.” However, the Taliban’s shrewd economic strategy of diversifying trade and economic resources to reduce dependence on Pakistan, combined with Islamabad’s sense of falling behind in the region’s new economic arrangements, pushed Pakistan to adjust its approach. The trilateral meeting last May between representatives of China, Pakistan, and the Taliban, and the invitation for Afghanistan to join the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), reflect this shift.
Meanwhile, the meeting of Central Asian and Indian foreign ministers—held with the Taliban’s informal participation to promote the North–South Corridor and Chabahar Port development—further alarmed Pakistan and convinced it to enhance its economic engagement with the Taliban. However, increased economic interaction between Islamabad and Kabul could ultimately consolidate the Taliban’s position and increase the pressure on Pakistan to proceed more quickly with the official recognition of the new Kabul government.

• Regional and International Considerations
A significant portion of Pakistan’s considerations regarding the official recognition of the Taliban relates to its regional and international concerns.
At the regional level, China and India will exert the greatest influence on Pakistan’s decision. China, Pakistan’s most prominent regional partner (particularly in the economic sphere) has shown strong interest in resolving Pakistan–Taliban disputes and has made significant efforts in this regard. At present, China has even closer relations with the Taliban, as it became the first country to formally accept the credentials of the Taliban ambassador. However, concerns of its key ally Pakistan, as well as issues related to countering extremist groups, have so far prevented Beijing from officially recognizing the Taliban government.
India, by contrast, presents the opposite case. Throughout history, close ties between Kabul and New Delhi have been one of Islamabad’s main concerns. Indeed, Pakistan’s investment in the Taliban was originally aimed at strengthening its stance against India and what became known as Pakistan’s “strategic depth.” Yet, amid recent tensions between Pakistan and the Taliban, the expansion of New Delhi–Kabul relations and events such as the Central Asia–India foreign ministers’ meeting focusing on Afghanistan’s transit role have raised alarm in Islamabad that continued estrangement from the Taliban could carry the heavy price of pushing Afghanistan into India’s orbit.
Finally, Pakistan’s main consideration in recognizing the Taliban government will depend on broader international dynamics. Some analysts view Russia’s recent move to officially recognize the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan as something beyond narrow national interests. In this framework, Moscow’s recognition of the Taliban should be seen within a much larger strategic effort to create an alternative axis of states united not only by their shared interests but also by an ideological rejection of the Western liberal order. Accordingly, Russia is counting on countries such as China, Iran, and the Central Asian states. Such a bloc seeks to integrate the Taliban, thereby removing Afghanistan from the political sphere of U.S. and Western influence.
But .what about Pakistan? In a world where the old international order is crumbling and instability is on the rise, Pakistan has so far acted cautiously, attempting to balance between the key elements of the emerging order (China and Russia) and those of the old order (the United States and the West). Its deep economic dependence on China, combined with continued reliance on U.S. and Western aid, reflects its attempt to maintain equilibrium. Naturally, in such a situation, any move to follow Moscow in recognizing the Taliban—without considering Washington’s stance—would likely carry heavy political consequences for Islamabad. The only factor that could mitigate these consequences would be if other countries joined the process of recognizing the Taliban, or if a regional or international consensus on official recognition emerged.

Conclusion

Pakistan’s official recognition of the Taliban government in Afghanistan is shaped by two sets of considerations: domestic and external. On the domestic side, counterterrorism issues—especially combating TTP—are Islamabad’s foremost concern, as Pakistan continues to emphasize the presence of terrorist bases in Afghanistan and refers to them as “permanent sources of concern.” The Durand Line issue may also have some, albeit limited, impact. Meanwhile, economic factors could serve as a strong driver pushing Pakistan toward quicker recognition.
Overall, considering Pakistan’s performance in recent months, it appears that after unsuccessful attempts to secure the Taliban’s cooperation in counterterrorism or in stabilizing the Durand Line, Islamabad has concluded that it must focus on resolving these issues internally while redirecting its relationship with Afghanistan and the Taliban toward "carrot policy" rooted in deeper economic ties. 
While such an approach in domestic issues may create a favorable ground for official recognition of the Taliban, Pakistan’s main concern lies elsewhere: regional and especially international considerations. From this perspective, Pakistan’s need to maintain engagement and balance in its international relations dictates that it should not rush into recognizing the Taliban. Instead, Islamabad will likely wait for an international or regional consensus—or at least recognition of the Taliban by several other countries. The spokesperson for the Pakistani Foreign Ministry also confirmed this approach and stated that this is an important and serious decision that must be made with consideration of timing, conditions, and global cooperation.