Introduction
One of the notable examples in Kazakhstan’s foreign policy method is the way this country has managed to balance its recent nuclear cooperation. This experience, which can be defined within the framework of “nuclear diplomacy” (one of the manifestations of its multi-vector strategy), has enabled simultaneous cooperation with China and Russia in nuclear industries — creating a platform for active balancing efforts as well as stabilization of national interests. This platform, above all, reflects an intelligent combination of geopolitics, economics, and diplomacy.
Kazakhstan’s multi-vector foreign policy, which took shape in the 1990s, is founded on the principle that the country should not be dependent on any single power. Rather, it must maintain balanced relations with all major global actors — Russia, China, the European Union, and the United States. In recent years (especially after the war in Ukraine), this approach has evolved from a mere survival strategy into a framework for “growth amid intensified rivalries and great power confrontation.”
This perspective shows that Astana, having moved beyond the transitional challenges of previous decades, now plays an effective and balancing role in the regional political-security landscape. A striking example of this foreign policy behavior is the way Kazakhstan manages its relations with China and Russia — particularly in the domain of “nuclear cooperation.” The following text reviews and analyzes this context.

Kazakhstan–Russia Relations
Kazakhstan and Russia are both members of the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) and the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). These platforms have created deep economic and security ties — to the extent that, during the January 2022 unrest in Kazakhstan, CSTO forces intervened in support of the Kazakh government. However, Kazakhstan has refrained from engaging in any external military or security events (such as the war in Ukraine) through these organizations or any similar structures.
Nonetheless, on August 6, 2025, Vladimir Putin, President of Russia, after meeting with Steven Witkoff, the Special Representative of the U.S. President, informed the President of Kazakhstan by phone about the content of their conversation. The Kremlin stated that this contact was made within the framework of the requirements of strategic partnership, and that Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, President of Kazakhstan, welcomed positive steps toward a peaceful resolution of the crisis. Clearly, this act highlights Kazakhstan’s position as a reliable and closely observing party in Russia–West diplomacy.
Kazakhstan–China Relations
China is Kazakhstan’s largest trading partner. Through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), China has made vast investments in Kazakhstan’s transportation, energy, and mining infrastructure. However, Kazakhstan appears cautious to prevent this relationship from turning into political dependency.
Since 2023, with the support of the European Union, Kazakhstan has strengthened its policy of export diversification — aiming to avoid excessive dependence on the Chinese market and to rebalance its shared economic space with Beijing. In recent years, there have also been instances of civic resistance to Chinese presence in areas such as agriculture and other sectors.
Despite these developments, the prolonged tensions between the West and Russia over Ukraine — and the resulting impact on Kazakh–Russian cooperation — have led Astana to reconsider aspects of its foreign partnerships, simultaneously elevating China’s position as a powerful and reliable neighbor.

Kazakhstan’s Nuclear Diplomacy
A significant case revealing Kazakhstan’s foreign policy approach is how it balances its nuclear cooperation initiatives. This experience, falling within the country’s “nuclear diplomacy” (a manifestation of its multi-vector strategy. On July 31, Roman Sklyar, First Deputy Prime Minister of Kazakhstan, announced at a press conference that China would construct Kazakhstan’s third nuclear power plant. This announcement came shortly after the government’s June decision to award the contract for the second plant to the China National Nuclear Corporation (CNNC) — and only one day before President Xi Jinping’s visit to Astana for the China–Central Asia Summit.
Meanwhile, in June, Kazakhstan had officially awarded the project for constructing its first nuclear power plant to Russia’s Rosatom, a “symbolic” event that received wide media coverage in both countries. Thus, Astana appears to be dividing its nuclear infrastructure cooperation opportunities between major powers — a move that may be viewed both as a strategic foresight and a geopolitical balancing act: maintaining ties with Moscow while simultaneously turning toward Beijing (a more reliable partner and one less affected by Western sanctions).
While Rosatom remains responsible for building Kazakhstan’s first nuclear power plant — scheduled for completion by 2035 or later — the feasibility of this timeline remains uncertain, given Russia’s financial constraints amid the ongoing war in Ukraine and intensified Western sanctions. In contrast, CNNC benefits from China’s strong industrial base, ample budget, and — most importantly — exemption from Western sanctions, making it a much more active and politically secure partner for Kazakhstan.
Accordingly, although Russia has been designated the contractor for the first nuclear plant, it is highly likely that the Chinese contractor will finalize its project far earlier — completing the second or even third nuclear power plant — meaning that, in practice, Kazakhstan’s first operational nuclear facility may be built by China, not Russia.
It is also notable that the news about Kazakhstan’s decision to select China for constructing its third nuclear power plant emerged just as Russia announced its withdrawal from building three thermal power plants in Kazakhstan (projects worth $2 billion, scheduled for launch in 2024). Meanwhile, several Russian analysts regard Rosatom’s $14-billion contract for Kazakhstan’s first nuclear plant as an overly costly and risky venture.
At the same time, President Tokayev has repeatedly stated that Kazakhstan remains open to cooperation with other countries — including Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power (KHNP) and France’s EDF — and has even proposed the idea of forming an international consortium under the supervision of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).
These evolving alignments may have significant implications for Kazakhstan’s foreign policy capacity and its role in energy diplomacy and regional security. Indeed, this dynamism may be seen as an updated version of Kazakhstan’s pragmatic, multi-vector foreign policy of previous decades — now shifting from a model of “passive balancing” to one of “active coordination amid great-power competition.”
By consolidating China as its principal nuclear partner, Kazakhstan not only shields itself from Russian volatility but also positions itself as an independent actor in regional energy and security diplomacy — thereby enhancing its autonomy and influence in regional diplomacy.
Nevertheless, it should also be noted that Kazakhstan’s strategic inclination toward China could influence its relations with potential Western partners (the EU and the United States). Analysts have also raised concerns about possible technological and industrial dependency on China — particularly in sensitive nuclear sectors — which could increase Kazakhstan’s vulnerability.

Conclusion
Kazakhstan’s model of structuring nuclear cooperation with foreign partners — termed here as “nuclear diplomacy” — and its simultaneous engagement with two major neighboring powers, China and Russia, represents an effective means of achieving “sustainable interest assurance” and “active balancing”, in order to realize its security and national interests.
In fact, while allocating opportunities to its traditional partner, the Kremlin, Kazakhstan is simultaneously absorbing the capacities of its more reliable partner, China, and creating more achievable opportunities in cooperation with Beijing. Thus, while avoiding potential confrontation with Russia, Kazakhstan has successfully designed a more secure path for attracting investment and transferring technology in its nuclear industry — while also creating greater flexibility for political, security, and energy diplomacy at the regional level.
If fully realized, this strategy would exemplify a smart integration of geopolitics, economics, and diplomacy — standing as one of the most notable achievements of Kazakhstan’s pragmatic, multi-vector foreign policy. Moreover, it could serve as an instructive model for policymakers in the Islamic Republic of Iran.