Introduction
A realistic understanding of Pakistan’s approach and policy toward the Taliban’s opponents must be based on its long-term foreign policy principles regarding Afghanistan. Pakistan’s foreign policy strategy toward the Taliban government cannot be viewed as a selective and ad hoc matter; rather, it is a part of the Pakistan's sustainable and long-term foreign policy towards Afghanistan, which is implemented in a pragmatic and selective manner— depending on the circumstances.
Pakistan’s foreign policy toward Afghanistan is grounded in realism and rooted in long-standing territorial, political, and security disputes. In this regard, two issues should be considered:
First, Pakistan views itself as a product of the partition of British India, recognizing that it emerged as a fragile and insecure state. Its enduring conflict with India stems from this historical division. Islamabad believes that India, since its inception, has opposed the “Two-Nation Theory” and the very existence of Pakistan, seeking its weakening or destruction. Pakistan military believes that India seeks regional hegemon and must be resisted.
Second, Pakistan and Afghanistan have a deep-rooted territorial dispute over the Durand Line, which for Islamabad is as crucial as the Kashmir issue. From the perspective of Pakistan’s intelligence institutions, Afghanistan—due to its internal instability and susceptibility to Indian influence—represents a potential source of insecurity. Conversely, Afghanistan, holding to its historical claims, never accepted the Durand Line and was the only country to vote against Pakistan’s membership in the United Nations in 1947.
Accordingly, Pakistan’s approach toward Afghanistan has been both defensive and offensive, shaped by geopolitical position and historical conflicts. Throughout its political life, Pakistan has adopted a dual policy toward Kabul, based on the concerns it has always had from Afghanistan. The experience of the last four years, following the Taliban’s return to power, also shows that Islamabad continues to pursue tactical support for the Taliban regime while maintaining strategic pressure through the opposition groups.
Keeping the Afghan opposition semi-active (on standby) provides Pakistan with a diplomatic and political leverage tool. These groups can play a role in the Afghan political processes and help Pakistan achieve its goals.
 
The Background of Pakistan’s Relations with Afghan Opposition 
Since its establishment in 1947, Pakistan’s foreign policy toward Afghanistan has been shaped by historical, geopolitical, and security conflicts. One consistent feature of this policy has been the instrumental use of Afghan opposition groups to achieve Islamabad's strategic goals.
In the 1950s and 1960s, disputes over the Durand Line and Kabul’s support for the slogan “Free Pashtunistan” made Islamabad perceive Afghanistan as a serious threat. In response, Pakistan began supporting Islamist and political opposition movements to counterbalance Kabul’s influence.
During the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan (1979), Pakistan, with U.S. and Saudi backing, supported the Afghan Mujahideen—both to undermine the pro-Soviet regime in Kabul and to preserve its “strategic depth” against India. This became a defining moment, embedding a long-term habit of using Afghan opposition groups as Islamabad’s foreign policy instruments.
In the 1990s, after the fall of the communist regime and the onset of civil war in Afghanistan, Pakistan again backed anti-government factions, particularly the Taliban, to consolidate its influence in the country. For Islamabad, widespread support for the Taliban was both a means to counter Indian influence and to stabilize a pro-Islamabad regime in Kabul.
After 2001 and the fall of the Taliban, Islamabad publicly supported Afghanistan’s elected governments while covertly maintaining ties with the Taliban and other opposition groups. The rationale behind this dual policy lay in Pakistan’s persistent distrust of Kabul due to its close relations with India, and in its fear that the consolidation of a strong, centralized Afghan government could pose a geopolitical threat to Pakistan.
Overall, Pakistan has historically viewed Afghan opposition forces not merely as enemies of Kabul but as flexible tools in its regional strategy that can be used to contain security threats, limit Indian influence, and maintain its "strategic depth" against regional rivals. 
With this outlook, Pakistan’s grand strategy toward Afghanistan rests on the tactical use of Taliban opponents as political leverage. Historical evidence clearly shows that Islamabad’s foreign policy in this domain has been grounded in realism and tactical pragmatism, with a selective nature. In other words, depending on circumstances and temporary needs, Pakistan has alternated between weakening the Afghan government’s opponents, and managing or directing them to serve its regional and security interests.
This historical background and enduring strategic approach strengthen the likelihood that Islamabad views the Taliban’s opponents as opportunities to enhance Pakistan’s bargaining power, sustain its strategic influence in Afghanistan, and use them as assets in its engagements.

Pakistan’s Approach Toward the Current Opponents of the Taliban 
On the night the Taliban overthrew the Republic state in August 2021, several Afghan jihadist and political leaders—both anti-Taliban and anti-Ghani—were present in Pakistan as guests of then–Foreign Minister Shah Mahmood Qureshi. This exemplifies Islamabad’s continued historical approach toward Afghanistan. 
Following the Taliban’s return to power, Pakistan entered a complex and dual phase in its foreign policy. On one hand, Islamabad initially welcomed the Taliban’s victory, expecting a friendly regime to secure its regional interests. On the other hand, tensions over the Durand Line and the resurgence of Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) forced Islamabad to proceed cautiously and maintain its leverage within Afghanistan.
Although Pakistan has so far refrained from openly hosting or funding anti-Taliban groups, this does not mean that Pakistan has completely given up supporting the Taliban opponents. For instance, in late September 2025, Islamabad hosted a conference titled “Towards Unity and Trust,” attended by Afghan opposition figures, such as civil society activists, women’s rights advocates, and representatives of political parties.
This duality partly reflects the divide between Pakistan’s civilian government and the military establishment. The Pakistani government led by Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif, apparently prioritizes economic engagement and diplomatic legitimization of the Taliban, while the military establishment has a security and instrumental view of Afghanistan, with its priority being to confront the TTP. Hosting Afghan opposition figures could thus be a product of this gap; a move that is actually used as a lever to pressure the Taliban government. Historical experience has shown that Islamabad has often used these groups as temporary tools, and their role has diminished after Pakistan has achieved its goal.
Overall, Pakistan’s relations with the Taliban opposition after 2021 have been informal and instrumental – a policy that seeks to exert pressure on Kabul through infiltration and management of opposition groups. This policy may, of course, change or be adjusted in the future, based on political, security, and regional developments. 

Pakistan's goals in adopting a dual policy
1. Containing the Taliban Government in Afghanistan
Because Pakistan supported the Taliban against the former Republic state and the U.S. presence in Afghanistan, Islamabad expected the Taliban leadership, after their victory, to remain fully aligned with Pakistan and to coordinate their foreign policy accordingly. After the Taliban’s takeover, Pakistan actively sought to shape regional policy toward Kabul and to lead international recognition efforts. Islamabad also tried to influence the Taliban’s foreign policy in a manner consistent with its own strategic interests.
Contrary to these expectations, however, the Taliban government adopted a relatively independent approach. In addition, due to the historical support provided by TTP to the Afghan Taliban during their fight against the United States, Kabul even tolerated and, in some cases, hosted supporters of the group.
At the same time, the Taliban government attempted to mediate between Pakistan and the TTP in an effort to manage TTP’s conflict with the Pakistani army as well as demonstrate its goodwill toward Islamabad. However, Kabul refused Pakistan’s request to assist in eliminating the TTP. This stance led Pakistani policymakers to suspect that the Afghan Taliban sought to use the TTP as a political bargaining chip or deterrent against Pakistan.
Consequently, Pakistani strategists have maintained their traditional policy of keeping channels open with Afghan opposition groups, using them as tools to control the Taliban’s behavior when necessary.
2. Containing TTP
Strategic and security analyses often affirm that states sometimes manage or neutralize their opponents through proxy forces. One of Pakistan’s main security concerns is the instability of its border regions with Afghanistan, caused by the presence of TTP fighters. If the situation deteriorates into an uncontrollable crisis, the TTP could exploit Afghan territory as a strategic depth and opportunity.
In such a scenario, Pakistani strategists might consider arming and supporting Afghan opposition forces, allowing them to establish control over border areas. This would deny TTP militants any opportunity to entrench themselves in these zones.
3. Creating opportunities from Afghanistan’s Political Crises
Historically, Pakistan has positioned itself alongside the United States in major geopolitical rivalries and regional power struggles. While often playing a role in the downfall of unfriendly Afghan governments, Islamabad has simultaneously portrayed itself as part of the solution. In fact, Pakistan has pursued its national security and even its economic interests through great-power competition.
Whenever Pakistan’s relations with Afghan central governments have become hostile, opposition groups—often with Pakistan’s covert backing—have emerged as active players in the Afghan arena through gradual conflict and tension. Experience shows that whenever a major international power has supported Afghan opposition movements, Pakistan has also aligned itself with that front, based on the existing conditions. In terms of Pakistan's possible support for the Taliban opponents, this alignment with foreign powers is worth considering.
4. Countering India’s Influence
India’s presence and engagement in Afghanistan have long been a major concern for Pakistan and a determining factor in Islamabad–Kabul relations. Pakistan perceives India’s involvement in Afghanistan as a direct threat to its national security, feeling encircled by two potentially hostile neighbors.
Historically, Afghan opposition groups backed by Pakistan have also opposed Indian influence in Afghanistan. In response, India has always adopted a wait-and-see approach and has pursued dialogue diplomacy after the opposition has established itself as the ruling power. New Delhi’s current approach toward the Taliban government is consistent with this historical pattern.
5. Managing the Durand Line Dispute
Another crucial element for Pakistan—and a potential advantage for Taliban opponents in their strategic cooperation with Pakistan—is that most of these opposition groups refrain from reigniting the territorial dispute over the Durand Line.
Tajik, Uzbek, and Hazara political movements and figures typically view the Durand Line controversy as a source of enduring hostility between Afghanistan and Pakistan. Consequently, they reject reopening this issue, arguing that escalating this issue is not in the interest of Afghanistan.
If the Taliban government wants to revive its claims over the Durand Line, Pakistan will likely reassess its approach to the opposition groups—many of whom have historically avoided the dispute—and may strengthen its support for them as a counterbalance to Kabul.

Capacity and Potential of the Taliban’s Opponents
The Taliban’s opposition includes semi-active military fronts, such as the National Resistance Front (NRF) and the Afghanistan Freedom Front (AFF), as well as ethnic groups, political parties, and civil organizations. Although these actors have limited trust in Islamabad due to past instrumental use of them, they retain some degree of social support, local influence, and human resources. As such, they can serve as leverage for Pakistan—to pressure or balance the Taliban government, or to gain diplomatic advantage in negotiations with other regional powers. It can be said that the Taliban opponents still represent a potential capacity for Islamabad, although there are some limitations and challenges in this regard.
The Taliban’s opponents include former jihadist factions, political movements, civil society organizations, and ethnic representatives. This diversity creates both opportunities and challenges. On one hand, Pakistan can selectively engage with specific groups according to its strategic priorities. On the other hand, coordination among these factions is difficult, and internal divisions remain a persistent risk—as demonstrated during the conflicts of the 1980s and 1990s among Mujahideen groups.
Some opposition groups, particularly the NRF in the north as well as the Pashtun and Hazara factions, possess significant local and traditional support bases. These assets could be utilized by Pakistan as instruments of political or security pressure in key regions, including the border areas as well as the central and northern Afghanistan.
Nevertheless, several major obstacles limit Pakistan’s ability to exploit these capacities:
1.The deep distrust between the Taliban’s opponents and Pakistan.
2.The Taliban government’s total control over Afghan territory.
3.International pressure to preserve Afghanistan’s stability.
4.The complexity of evolving regional security dynamics.

Despite potential advantages, historical experience shows that Afghan opposition groups have often been used as temporary tools by Islamabad and they marginalized once Pakistan achieved its goals. Northern Alliance figures—composed largely of Tajiks and Uzbeks—have repeatedly voiced this criticism.
Given this history, a key question arises: what could motivate Taliban opponents to cooperate again with Pakistan?
Analyses suggest that engaging with Islamabad—whether semi-formally or informally—brings limited benefits to the Taliban opposition: access to financial or political resources; the ability to maintain regional and local networks; and opportunities to sustain their visibility within Afghanistan’s political landscape. These opportunities increase their incentives to interact with Pakistan.
However, such benefits remain conditional upon the continuation of Islamabad's policies. Historical patterns demonstrate that Pakistan’s policies can change abruptly, based on its own interests. Therefore, there is no guarantee that these groups would gain lasting or meaningful advantages from this collaboration.

Conclusion
Pakistan’s approach toward the Taliban’s opponents has always been dual and instrumental. While the opposition’s capacity presents Islamabad with opportunities for influence, this tactical game can simultaneously lead to the limitation and dependency of these groups, or at least to their being labeled as dependent on Pakistan. Looking ahead, Pakistan is likely to continue a hybrid policy: maintaining direct engagement with the Taliban while selectively leveraging their opponents, in a way that maximizes benefits and minimizes risks and losses for Islamabad.