Introduction
In recent weeks, statements by the U.S. President regarding the necessity of reclaiming the Bagram Airbase have once again brought Afghanistan to the center of international attention. The Taliban, however, immediately rejected this request. They reminded the US of the Doha agreement and emphasized that any US military presence would be a violation of the country's national sovereignty. Since military intervention without the consent of the incumbent government lacks legitimacy under international law, this issue has raised fresh questions in political and media circles. 
Trump’s remarks—particularly his warning that “bad things” will happen if Bagram is not taken back—sparked widespread reaction. Many analysts viewed his words primarily as a “political gesture” aimed at domestic audiences and a “display of decisiveness” during the election season, rather than an operational plan. Meanwhile, some observers highlighted the geopolitical aspect of the issue, noting that Bagram’s proximity to China’s borders and its key strategic centers could serve as a major motivation behind this idea.
The Taliban’s response to these threats was firm and unambiguous. The group’s spokesperson urged the U.S. to act with “realism and rationality,” while the Taliban’s defense minister declared any handover of Afghan territory inconceivable. These positions indicate that the Taliban government does not intend to turn the U.S. return into a pretext for legitimizing foreign interventions. At the same time, regional countries—including China, Russia, the Islamic Republic of Iran, and Pakistan—have voiced deep concern over the possibility of a renewed U.S. presence. They believe Washington’s return could disrupt regional security balances and intensify geopolitical rivalries.
This analytical report seeks to examine various dimensions of the issue. It first discusses the strategic importance of Bagram for the United States, then analyzes the Taliban’s position, and finally evaluates potential scenarios for a U.S. return and the likely responses of regional and extra-regional actors.

The Strategic Importance of Bagram for the United States
The Bagram Airbase holds critical significance for the United States in several respects:

Military and Strategic Dimension
Until the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2021, Bagram served as the heart of U.S. military operations in the region. The base featured an exceptionally long runway, the capacity to host heavy aircraft such as the B-52 and C-17, and advanced logistical and maintenance facilities. Its location enabled the United States to maintain aerial and intelligence coverage over all of Afghanistan, large parts of Central Asia, Pakistan, and even western China. Bagram was the central hub for operations against al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and later Islamic State of Khorasan Province (ISKP). A U.S. return to Bagram would, in effect, mean reestablishing a “counterterrorism base at the heart of the region.”

Geopolitical Dimension
Bagram’s geographic proximity to the borders of China, Russia, and Iran gives it extraordinary importance. Control of Bagram would provide the U.S. with a strategic “eye and ear” in Central Asia, potentially altering the regional balance of power against Chinese (Belt and Road) and Russian influence. Afghanistan serves as the connecting link between South Asia, Central Asia, and the Middle East. A U.S. presence at Bagram would thus enable Washington to play a decisive role in regional energy corridors, trade routes, and security networks.
Intelligence and Security Dimension
Bagram was not merely an airbase; it housed extensive intelligence and communications infrastructure. The U.S. used it to conduct information-gathering operations in Afghanistan and neighboring countries. Given Afghanistan’s geopolitical location, Bagram held immense value for monitoring terrorist networks, drug-trafficking routes, and cross-border movements.

Symbolic and Political Dimension
The hasty U.S. withdrawal from Bagram in 2021 came to symbolize America’s “defeat” in Afghanistan. Reclaiming the base could be portrayed domestically and internationally as the restoration of U.S. “credibility and hegemony.” Even the mere discussion of returning to Bagram can serve as a political and diplomatic pressure tool against the Taliban—its psychological and symbolic value arguably outweighs its military one.
In sum, Bagram represents a multifaceted asset for the United States. From Washington’s perspective, control of the base would not only facilitate counterterrorism efforts but also serve as a strategic card in its broader competition with China, Russia, and Iran.
Between 2001 and 2020, the United States (and its NATO allies) used Bagram extensively. During this period, the base became the command center for coalition forces in Afghanistan. Many major operational decisions—from strikes against Taliban positions to targeting al-Qaeda—were planned and executed from Bagram.
Equipped with two long runways, the base allowed large cargo aircraft (C-17s and C-130s) to directly transport troops, equipment, and ammunition. It also served as a major launch site for drones and fighter jets. Many operations against al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and later ISKP were conducted from there. U.S. and allied special forces used Bagram as a staging ground for night raids and targeted missions against insurgent leaders.
Furthermore, Bagram functioned as a major intelligence hub. The U.S. employed it for signal interception, surveillance of insurgent movements, and security data collection across the region. Parts of the base housed a high-security prison where hundreds of suspected terrorists were detained and interrogated—an issue that later became one of the most controversial human-rights aspects of the U.S. presence in Afghanistan.
In addition to U.S. forces, other NATO members—including the United Kingdom, Germany, and France—utilized parts of the Bagram facility. It served as an “international logistics hub,” allowing coordination among allied operations. The base also contained Afghanistan’s largest U.S. military hospital, which treated both foreign soldiers and, occasionally, Afghan civilians.
Bagram thus stood as a symbol of American power and long-term presence in Afghanistan—a virtual “U.S. military city” in the country’s heart. Consequently, when the U.S. withdrew in 2021, the evacuation of Bagram came to be seen as the definitive end of Washington’s era in Afghanistan.

The Taliban’s Position
The Taliban government insists that, under current conditions, it will not allow the United States to return or reoccupy the Bagram base. However, as in the past, the group’s actual position depends on various factors that may change over time. Therefore, assessing the potential advantages and disadvantages of a U.S. return to Bagram for the Taliban—together with current changing circumstances—provides a clearer picture of the issue.
According to reports, Taliban spokespersons have categorically rejected any U.S. military return or renewed foreign troop presence in Afghanistan. Emphasizing national independence and territorial integrity, they have declared that “not an inch” of Afghan soil will revert to foreign control. The Taliban have repeatedly invoked the Doha Agreement, which explicitly prohibits the use of force or military threats against Afghanistan by external powers.
Consequently, the Taliban’s current official position is that any U.S. attempt to retake Bagram is unacceptable. The reasons behind this stance can be explained along several key lines:
Domestic Legitimacy: One of the main pillars of the Taliban’s legitimacy rests on its claim to have ended foreign domination and restored independence. A U.S. return to Bagram would severely undermine this domestic legitimacy and embolden internal opposition.
Security Concerns: A renewed U.S. presence would significantly enhance Washington’s intelligence-gathering and surveillance capabilities over Taliban movements and allied groups, posing a direct threat to Taliban control.
Public and Regional backlash: A large portion of the Afghan population as well as several regional states support the principle of independence from foreign interference. Thus, the Taliban fear that accepting a renewed U.S. presence could trigger domestic backlash or public unrest.
International Legitimacy: International agreements—especially the Doha Accord—contain clauses opposing foreign military intervention. The Taliban seek to strengthen their international legitimacy by adhering to these commitments.

However, the key question remains: will these positions remain absolute and permanent?

Answering this requires examining the variables that could alter the Taliban’s stance:
• First, Afghanistan’s deep economic crisis—including sanctions, declining foreign aid, and reduced investment—has left the Taliban in a vulnerable position that might compel them to seek conditional cooperation or assistance from the United States.
• Second, since the Taliban have not yet achieved full international recognition, they may be willing to grant limited concessions—such as non-military access or security cooperation—in exchange for achieving diplomatic recognition from some countries.
• Third, if terrorist groups linked to al-Qaeda or ISKP become strong enough that the Taliban can no longer fully control them, the group might consider limited external cooperation to manage these threats.
• Fourth, mounting international pressure, intensified sanctions, or the threat of further isolation could push the Taliban toward negotiation and concessions.

Therefore, given the Taliban’s relative consolidation of power since 2021 and their need to capitalize domestically on opposition to U.S. return, their current stance toward Washington’s reentry remains “decisively negative.” Nonetheless, in the medium or long term, if economic hardship worsens, the need for international aid grows, or terrorist threats expand, the Taliban may exhibit some flexibility—not necessarily in the form of full U.S. military presence, but rather through temporary cooperation, limited agreements, or controlled access under defined arrangements.

The Possibility of the U.S. Return; Plausible Scenarios
Under the current circumstances, a full and official return of the United States to Afghanistan with the aim of reoccupying Bagram Airbase or redeploying large-scale military forces seems unlikely due to a combination of deterrent factors. These include strategic fatigue resulting from prolonged wars, opposition from U.S. public opinion and Congress to renewed large expenditures in Afghanistan, the Taliban’s strong resistance, the acute sensitivity of regional powers such as Iran, Russia, China, and Pakistan, and the availability of less costly alternatives such as drone operations and the use of existing bases in the Persian Gulf. However, a limited, indirect, or semi-covert U.S. return to Afghanistan remains conceivable.
Overall, several possible scenarios can be outlined here:

Scenario (1):  Full Military Return of the United States
This scenario envisions the reoccupation of Bagram Airbase and the direct deployment of combat forces. Its realization is improbable due to the very high political and financial costs, direct confrontation with the Taliban, and intense regional backlash—especially from China, Iran, and Russia. The likelihood of this option increases only if a catastrophic event comparable to the September 11 attacks were to emerge from Afghan soil against U.S. vital interests.

Scenario (2): Limited or Semi-Covert Presence
In this case, the U.S. could return in a limited form to Bagram or other smaller bases under the guise of “counterterrorism cooperation” or “technical support.” Such a presence might occur through private contractors rather than official military forces, or via limited collaboration with certain Taliban factions or local groups. The likelihood of this scenario is moderate and greater than the first option. This approach would allow the U.S. to maintain intelligence oversight of developments in Afghanistan and exert security pressure on China and the broader region without engaging in direct warfare.

Scenario (3): Utilizing Afghanistan’s Neighbors
Under this framework, the United States could employ existing military bases in Central Asia—particularly in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan—or infrastructure in the Persian Gulf to conduct drone and aerial operations. This scenario enables Washington to preserve its intelligence and air control capabilities without physically returning to Afghan territory. From the perspectives of cost and political risk, this option appears less expensive and relatively more feasible, and therefore more likely than the two preceding scenarios.

Scenario (4): Political-Intelligence Penetration
This approach emphasizes strengthening intelligence networks, supporting anti-Taliban factions, and applying diplomatic and economic pressure. In such a situation, the U.S. would not maintain a direct military presence in Afghanistan, but it could create the groundwork for future scenarios—particularly in the event of internal political or security shifts. This scenario most closely aligns with Washington’s current foreign policy approach toward the Taliban: external pressure coupled with minimal engagement. Among all proposed options, this is considered the most probable.

Implications and Reactions to a Possible U.S. Return
The possible return of the United States to Afghanistan—and especially the reoccupation of Bagram Airbase—would not merely constitute a limited military move, but rather a geopolitical development with far-reaching consequences for regional security, diplomacy, and the balance of power. Bagram, which for two decades served as the operational heart of U.S. military activities in Afghanistan, would once again become a focal point of regional and global competition should Washington reestablish its presence there. The reactions of key regional powers—from China and Russia to Iran, Pakistan, India, and the Central Asian republics—will determine the future outlook of such a presence. Below is a concise examination of potential reactions and consequences for each actor.

1. China: Intensified Strategic Rivalry and a Sense of Direct Threat
From Beijing’s perspective, a renewed U.S. presence in Bagram—especially near its western borders—constitutes a direct threat to its national security. Trump’s remarks about Bagram being “one hour away” from China’s sensitive centers, though somewhat exaggerated, convey a clear message: Washington intends to use Afghanistan as a lever to contain Beijing.
Such a presence would have multiple implications for China:

•  Heightened security concerns in Xinjiang and the potential for increased instability among Uyghur communities;
•  Expanded U.S. intelligence and electronic surveillance operations targeting Chinese military and technological activities; and
•  Disruption of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), a key portion of which traverses Central Asia.

China’s likely response would include strengthening military cooperation with Russia and Iran, enhancing its security footprint in Central Asia, and investing more in multilateral diplomacy (such as through the Shanghai Cooperation Organization) to isolate Washington.

2. Russia: Protecting Its “Backyard” and Retaliatory Countermeasures
Russia traditionally considers Central Asia as its sphere of influence and views a U.S. return to Bagram as a direct threat to its southern security. Such a move could upset the regional balance of power and weaken Moscow’s role in Central Asia. Potential implications for Russia include:

• Political and psychological pressure on the Kremlin to preserve its dominance in the “near abroad”;
• Concerns over Afghanistan being used as a U.S. platform for surveillance and operations against Russia in Central Asia and the Caucasus; and
• The erosion of Moscow’s position in regional arms and energy markets.

Likely Russian reactions could involve large-scale military exercises with Central Asian states, expanded arms sales to the Taliban and neighboring governments, and tripartite coordination with China and Iran to counter U.S. influence. 

3. Iran: Heightened Security Pressure and Diplomatic Maneuvering
The Islamic Republic of Iran, sharing long borders with Afghanistan, perceives any U.S. return to Bagram as a serious threat to national security and its regional influence. The experience of the past two decades has shown that direct U.S. presence in Afghanistan can affect border issues, energy security, and even proxy group dynamics. Potential implications for Iran include:

• Increased security pressure along its eastern borders and concern over the empowerment of extremist groups in the shadow of the U.S. presence;
• Reduced economic and cultural influence of Iran in Afghanistan; and
• The possibility that Washington may use Afghanistan as a lever of pressure on Iran in regional and nuclear issues.

Tehran’s likely response would rest on two pillars: First, Active regional diplomacy through cooperation with Russia, China, and organizations such as SCO to counter the U.S. presence; and second, Closer engagement with the Taliban to exert indirect pressure on Washington.

4. Pakistan: The Dilemma of Choosing Between Washington and the Taliban
Pakistan arguably faces the most complex dilemma among regional actors. On one hand, Islamabad has longstanding ties with the Taliban, and much of its border security depends on cooperation with the group. On the other hand, it still relies heavily on U.S. military and economic assistance. The implications of a renewed U.S. presence for Pakistan include:

• Diplomatic pressure from Washington to support or at least remain silent about U.S. operations;
• Heightened Taliban sensitivity and potential border clashes; and
• Intensified domestic public opposition, which remains strongly anti-American.

Pakistan’s likely reaction will center on balancing policies: maintaining relations with Washington to avoid isolation while managing close ties with the Taliban to prevent border crises. However, any miscalculation could drive Pakistan toward internal instability.

5. India: Diplomatic Opportunity and Security Concerns
India, as Pakistan’s long-standing rival, may see a U.S. presence in Afghanistan as both a threat and an opportunity. On one hand, proximity of U.S. forces to the Taliban and to Pakistan borders could weaken anti-Indian militant groups. On the other, regional instability could endanger India’s economic and investment projects in Afghanistan. For India, potential outcomes include: 

• Opportunities for deeper security and intelligence cooperation with the U.S. against extremist groups in Pakistan and Afghanistan; 
• Risks of heightened border tensions with Pakistan if the crisis in Afghanistan escalates;
• Greater involvement in Afghan reconstruction projects under U.S. patronage.

India’s probable response would involve strengthening multilateral diplomacy with both the U.S. and the Taliban government, coupled with increased investment in Afghanistan to counter Pakistani influence.

6. Central Asian States: Between Security and Great Power Rivalry
Central Asian states are likely to adopt ambivalent positions toward a U.S. return.
On one hand, U.S. involvement could enhance border security and help combat extremist threats. On the other, it risks transforming the region into an arena of great power competition.
The implications include:

• Increased dependency on external powers for security and economic support;
•  Greater pressure from Russia and China to limit cooperation with the U.S.;
• Potential internal political instability resulting from having to choose between great powers.

Their likely response would be to pursue cautious, multilateral diplomacy to avoid being trapped in Washington-Moscow-Beijing rivalries.

7. Regional Security and Terrorism
A U.S. return to Bagram would likely intensify extremist activity. The Taliban, seeking to prove its independence, might encourage limited attacks against U.S. forces or their allies. ISKP could also exploit such conditions to attract recruits and legitimize its operations. The security implications of U.S. presence would include:

• Increased insurgent and retaliatory attacks;
• Escalating humanitarian crises and refugee flows;
• Heightened security burdens on neighboring states, particularly Iran, Pakistan, and those of Central Asia.

8. Diplomatic and Symbolic Consequences
The U.S. return to Bagram would symbolize the revival of Washington’s presence in the geopolitical heart of Asia. This move would not only redefine the balance of power but also signal America’s determination to use Afghanistan as a lever against its global rivals.
Diplomatic consequences could include the formation of a joint front by China, Russia, Iran, and possibly Pakistan against Washington; Meanwhile, countries such as Turkey and the Gulf states might seize the opportunity to deepen ties with the U.S., resulting in a more polarized regional diplomacy and increased diplomatic tensions.

Conclusion
The potential U.S. return to Afghanistan and the reoccupation of Bagram Airbase transcend a mere military issue—it would fundamentally reshape the regional balance of power and carry extensive implications for the security, diplomacy, and economies of neighboring states.
China would perceive a direct threat; Russia would view its “backyard” as endangered; Iran would face mounting security pressure; Pakistan would confront the dilemma of choosing between the Taliban and Washington; India would encounter both new opportunities and heightened risks; and Central Asian states would find themselves caught amid great power rivalries.
Moreover, a U.S. return could stimulate the resurgence of terrorist groups and exacerbate humanitarian crises. Therefore, regional responses will depend not only on the military dimension of this presence but also on its strategic and symbolic ramifications.
What is certain is that the reoccupation of Bagram—if it occurs—would mark a turning point in regional geopolitics, bringing the security equations of Central and South Asia into a new phase.