Introduction
One of the most important foundations of relations between Iran and Central Asia over the past three decades has been geo-economic interdependence. Due to its landlocked nature, Central Asia has had a pressing need for transit access to open waters, while simultaneously remaining under the heavy shadow of geo-economic dependence on Russia. This is why the largest and earliest geo-economic projects in Central Asia following independence, such as the Mashhad–Sarakhs–Tejen railway and the Kordkuy–Korpeje gas pipeline, generated significant impacts. The same factor has also contributed to maintaining a certain degree of stability in relations between Iran and these countries.

However, as a result of the recent wars, including the 12-Day War and the Ramadan War, the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, the U.S. maritime blockade against Iran, and particularly the destabilization of Iran’s infrastructure due to repeated threats by the United States and the Zionist regime, this comparative advantage has lost much of its effectiveness. Although such a trend cannot be long-term and the geographical factor cannot be easily changed, it will have a certain impact on the prospects for the development of geo-economic exchanges and the state of "geo-economic interconnection" through political processes.

Therefore, a reassessment of the state of geo-economic interconnection between Iran and Central Asia, influenced by developments related to the Strait of Hormuz and the maritime blockade of Iran, constitutes an important issue in the recalibration of relations between the two sides. 
 
Intensification of the “Landlocked Condition” in Central Asia
As noted above, Central Asia is a landlocked region. According to reports, this condition imposes approximately 40 percent higher trade costs on these countries, and in some cases, it reduces trade volumes by as much as 80 percent compared to coastal states. In Central Asia, according to certain reports, transit costs account for approximately 50 percent of the total value of goods, five times the global average of 10 percent. This situation directly affects economic growth and even the attraction of direct foreign investment in these countries. Under such circumstances, the closure of the Strait of Hormuz and the maritime blockade against Iran, which exacerbates the landlocked conditions of these countries, have directly affected these indicators and their secondary outcomes, thereby influencing the domestic and foreign policy behavior of these states.

The most significant consequence of this phenomenon is inflation and its impact on the economies of these countries, operating through various variables such as energy. For oil- and gas-exporting countries in Central Asia, such as Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, the closure of the Strait of Hormuz and the simultaneous rise in oil prices translate into increased revenues. However, for energy-consuming countries, such as Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, this situation means the imposition of severe inflation. Rising energy prices directly affect the metallurgical, mining, chemical, and metal-processing industries that form the industrial and revenue-generating backbone of Central Asia and may even constrain the growth of these sectors.

Another affected sector is agriculture. According to available reports, 44 percent of the world’s sulfur, 31 percent of its urea, 18 percent of its ammonia, and 15 percent of its phosphate production pass through the Strait of Hormuz. Disruptions in the supply chain have therefore led to a sharp increase in agricultural fertilizer prices. This increase has affected agriculture-dependent economies, particularly grain-producing countries such as Kazakhstan, and has generated a separate source of inflation. The impact is equally evident for importing countries. At the same time, under inflationary conditions, investors—particularly the oligarchs of these countries—tend to purchase bonds in more stable emerging markets, a trend that effectively contributes to capital flight and the reproduction of inflation.

This situation has led Central Asian governments to have an inherent inclination toward accumulating gold as a traditional safe-haven asset. This trend has been highly visible thus far, as the central banks of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan ranked among the world’s leading purchasers and holders of gold during the wartime period. In 2025, Kazakhstan became the world’s second-largest buyer of gold after purchasing 57 tons. In 2026, during the initial phase of the war, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan once again ranked second and third globally, purchasing 16.5 and 6.5 tons of gold, respectively.

Based on available statistics, this policy appears to have been effective. Kazakhstan’s inflation rate declined to 10.4 percent in May 2026, whereas it had exceeded 12.5 percent in late 2025. In Uzbekistan, year-on-year inflation reached 5.5 percent in May 2026, a significant decline compared to the 7.3 percent recorded in February. However, this trend moved in the opposite direction in Kyrgyzstan (from 9.4 percent in December 2025 to 11.4 percent in April 2026) and Tajikistan (from 2.8 percent in September 2025 to 3.5 percent in April 2026), indicating greater vulnerability and weaker performance in these countries.

Alongside these developments, the secondary effects of these economic transformations may also generate socio-political consequences throughout the region. For example, the volume of water in major Kyrgyz reservoirs such as Toktogul, and consequently the level of electricity production, has had a significant impact on the country’s socio-political developments. The January 2022 protests in Kazakhstan clearly had economic roots, having been triggered by rising liquefied gas prices. It is noteworthy that when protests erupted in Karakalpakstan, Uzbekistan, in July 2022, the country’s inflation rate was also at its highest level in five years.

At the external level, this landlocked condition and the limitations on transit access have increased these countries’ dependence on Russia and China and have concentrated a greater share of their foreign trade along those routes. This runs counter to efforts aimed at diversifying foreign trade, increasing competition, and consequently reducing costs, thereby potentially exacerbating existing conditions. Such indicators and consequences demonstrate the significant impact of the closure of the Strait of Hormuz and the maritime blockade on the economic situation of Central Asia and, consequently, on these countries’ geo-economic interconnection with Iran.
 
Challenges to Geo-Economic Interconnection
The situation described above creates numerous challenges for geo-economic interconnection between Iran and Central Asia, and may affect the long-term and strategic dimensions of these relations. Because these challenges arise from the intersection of geopolitical and geo-economic variables under the most acute possible circumstances—namely an existential threat to Iran—they are highly complex and may manifest themselves across multiple levels and sectors.

First, this interconnection is damaged by the creation of a “negative image” of Iran, as public perception increasingly portrays “Iran” as the actor responsible for closing the Strait of Hormuz and, in a sense, “holding the global economy hostage.” The positions adopted by Central Asian countries regarding the Strait of Hormuz clearly demonstrate the existence of such perceptions. This is despite the fact that these countries have thus far shown only limited reactions to the U.S. policy of blockade. The continuation of such perceptions regarding the geopolitical status of Iran’s southern waters may further challenge geo-economic interconnection.

A second challenge is emerging in the energy sector. As a result of restrictions and uncertainties surrounding the transfer of Persian Gulf oil to global markets, energy actors in Central Asia have found greater incentives to invest and operate in regions not dependent on the Strait of Hormuz. In Kazakhstan, foreign partners—primarily American companies—have officially requested that the country increase its oil production. While reaffirming Astana’s commitment to maximizing production capacity, Kazakhstan’s Minister of Energy noted that the country’s current production is constrained by transportation capacities and extraction infrastructure. In reality, this position signaled two requests to Western partners.
First, the need to restrain Ukraine’s actions, which during the war created an additional disruption in Kazakhstan’s oil exports by attacking Kazakh oil transportation infrastructure in Russia; and second, the need for increased investment in Kazakhstan’s oil infrastructure. This trend may ultimately reproduce Kazakhstan’s dependence on the West, particularly on American companies. Under such circumstances, by reproducing the geo-economic dependence of these countries on the West, interconnection with Iran will be weakened.
The third challenge arises from the emergence of non-Iranian alternatives, a process that began not after this war but from the very first days of the 12-Day War. At that time, with the securitization of the Iranian route, the governments of Central Asia officially placed the revival and development of non-Iranian transit alternatives on their agendas for the first time.

During the recent war, this trend gained substantial support in terms of decision-making and resource allocation, particularly through a focus on the Middle Corridor. Central Asian countries, and Kazakhstan in particular, have viewed the closure of the Strait of Hormuz and the additional revenues generated by oil sales as an opportunity to consolidate their role and position within a new framework of relations with the West. In this regard, the President of Kazakhstan held a special meeting with the country's officials concerning the development of these corridors and the reduction of dependence on unstable regions.
A second route is taking shape through the Trans-Afghan Corridor. During the recent war, this corridor did not have the opportunity to emerge due to tensions between Pakistan and Afghanistan; however, interaction through the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) was increasingly presented as a growing alternative. The continuation of this trend, which appears likely in the future, will significantly affect Iran’s prominent position in providing stable, secure, and short transit access to southern open waters and will weaken this geo-economic interconnection.

The fourth challenge is the reproduction of geopolitical trends during the course of the war. The attacks by the Zionist regime on Iran’s port and maritime infrastructure in the Caspian Sea created the first threat that could manifest itself in the “militarization of the Caspian.” At the same time, Iran’s balancing measures toward American companies operating in the Arab states of the Persian Gulf generated a comparable level of “threat perception” in Central Asian countries, particularly Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan.
The military alert status of these countries, especially Kazakhstan’s naval patrols in the Caspian Sea, as well as the repeated visits of the Chief of the General Staff of Kazakhstan’s Armed Forces to naval units, have created the foundations for a shared security alignment between these countries, the United States, and the Zionist regime. This “state of readiness” against alleged “Iranian threats,” despite the fact that Iran has neither conducted any operation nor even taken any verbal action, constitutes an important factor in weakening the conditions necessary for geo-economic interconnection.

Alongside these key challenges, several additional constraining factors can also be identified. This war, and particularly the “neither war nor peace” situation in Iran that emerged after the ceasefire, has led to the suspension of previous trends of geo-economic convergence between Iran and Central Asia. In practice, joint projects have been halted, and the presence of these countries in Iran’s southern ports and other logistical infrastructures has encountered challenges. At the same time, the securitization of Iran-based routes has intensified considerably, increasing both transit costs and associated risks.
Furthermore, recent tensions have weakened the broader policy of neutrality in Central Asia, as the radical behavior of the West and the Zionist regime has fundamentally reduced the effectiveness of this policy compared to the past. These factors also have a significant impact on weakening geo-economic interconnection between Iran and Central Asia.
 
Emerging Opportunities
Despite the predominance of threats and challenges, several opportunities can also be identified within recent geo-economic developments.
The first and most important opportunity is to create a platform for the mutualization of geo-economic dependence and, in effect, achieving “mutual interdependence” in this sphere. Whereas Iran had previously been viewed by Central Asia solely as a route providing access to southern waters, under conditions of imposed blockade, direct railway access to China through Central Asia has increasingly attracted attention in Tehran, and its volume continues to grow.

According to a report published by Fox News during the war, direct rail transit between Iran and China experienced a 200 percent increase during the conflict. Under blockade conditions, this route– which reduces transit time between Iran and China from 40 days to 15 days– has found a favorable environment for infrastructure development, operationalization, and consolidation. If sustained, this development could provide an opportunity to revive geo-economic interconnection between Iran and Central Asia.

In addition, developments in Afghanistan and Pakistan’s position have led to the emergence of new alternatives to both the International North–South Transport Corridor (INSTC) and the Trans-Afghan Corridor. One example of these initiatives is the establishment of the Gabd Corridor by Pakistan under the international TIR system. [1] This corridor begins at the ports of Karachi and Gwadar in Pakistan and connects to Central Asia through Iran. It serves as an Iran-based alternative to both the Trans-Afghan Corridor and the INSTC, particularly following India’s specific policy positions. Notably, the first shipment transported through this route reached Tashkent through an initiative undertaken by Uzbekistan.

At the same time, during the war period, reports emerged concerning the participation of commercial banks in financing the Herat–Mazar-e Sharif railway project, estimated at approximately 55 billion Afghanis (around US$860 million). The completion and development of such a corridor, against the backdrop of tensions between Pakistan and Afghanistan in the south, could once again restore a degree of Iranian participation in the Trans-Afghan Corridor. If this railway connection is implemented, Iran and Uzbekistan will enjoy direct rail access without passing through Turkmenistan, a development that will profoundly affect the nature of Ashgabat’s future interactions.
Alongside these opportunities, attention should also be paid to Iran’s new position in redefining the regional corridor order. It is unlikely that the situation in the Strait of Hormuz will return to its previous state even after the end of the war. This factor, combined with the emergence of other options, will provide additional incentives for Central Asian countries to expand their presence and investment in Chabahar.

This, however, depends on the Islamic Republic of Iran adopting a more constructive and pragmatic approach toward corridor development and the consolidation and strengthening of geo-economic interconnection.
 
Conclusion: Iran’s Requirements During the Transition Period
The position and advantages of the Strait of Hormuz have demonstrated the superiority of geography over political and military instruments. Nevertheless, it should be recognized that the relative advantage of the Strait of Hormuz, which transformed it into a valuable instrument of “survival” for Iran, stemmed from the exceptionally high level of global geo-economic interconnection associated with this strategic chokepoint.
Such an experience should naturally alter Iran’s perspective and level of pragmatism regarding transport corridors and the importance of geo-economic chokepoints in shaping and moderating state behavior. Achieving this objective requires changing the level of decision-making in Iran regarding corridors. Therefore, decisions on this issue should be transferred from institutions such as the Ministry of Roads and Urban Development to the Supreme National Security Council of Iran, and its design should be carried out in the Expediency Discernment Council.

In this regard, given the opportunities and challenges facing geo-economic interconnection with Central Asia under conditions shaped by the Strait of Hormuz and the maritime blockade, several requirements and imperatives for Iran during the transition period can be identified.
First, the Islamic Republic of Iran must not only restore the level of geo-economic interconnection with Central Asia in the fields of transit, energy, and trade to pre–12-Day War conditions, but must also elevate it to a more strategic level. A short-term objective of transiting 20 million tons of cargo and a long-term objective of 50 million tons of transit to and from this region should be placed firmly on the national agenda of Iran.

Second, Iran must undertake a profound and highly serious reassessment of its level of pragmatism regarding the transit sector. This requires streamlining decision-making processes and resource allocation mechanisms in this field. In other words, the political and operational dimensions of corridor development must proceed in parallel.
Third, under the new conditions, Iran must demonstrate greater participation in regional initiatives in addition to strengthening its domestic infrastructure. Today, the acquisition of a 51 percent stake in the Khorgos Free Economic Zone on the Kazakhstan–China border by the United Arab Emirates has become a serious challenge for Iran. In this context, Iran should prioritize participation in the China–Kyrgyzstan–Uzbekistan Corridor and establish an operational logistical presence in Khorgos.

Furthermore, given the existing risks in the Caspian Sea and the inevitability of a certain degree of military and geopolitical tension under specific circumstances, and with the aim of reducing dependence on Azerbaijan for access to Russia, the East Caspian rail corridor to Russia should also be activated and seriously pursued.
Under such circumstances, the development of the Gabd Corridor, participation in the development of the Herat–Mazar-e Sharif railway route, and, in particular, the redefinition of the INSTC routes can also serve Iran’s interests.