Introduction
Following the Taliban’s return to power in 2021, developments in Afghanistan have created the conditions for new configurations of relationships, alliances, and geopolitical rivalries in Central and South Asia. Among these developments, the gradual expansion of political, security, and military relations between Russia and the Taliban government holds particular importance, as it reflects a significant shift in Moscow’s approach toward an actor that, for many years, had been viewed as a security threat to Russian interests and those of its regional partners. This shift in policy, which began with limited contacts and informal interactions in the mid-2010s, gradually expanded under mechanisms such as the Moscow Format and ultimately led to the practical acceptance of the Taliban as a political reality in Afghanistan.
Following the Taliban’s return to power, these relations entered broader stages through engagement, subsequent official recognition of the Taliban government, and most recently, the signing of a defense agreement between the two sides. Beyond demonstrating the growing closeness between Russia and the Taliban, this defense agreement is significant because it may indicate the emergence of a new understanding of the Taliban’s position and role within Russia’s regional strategy.
This development raises important questions. What objectives is Russia pursuing through the expansion of military cooperation with the Taliban? What impact will such cooperation have on Afghanistan’s security balance and its surrounding environment? To what extent might it influence the Taliban’s relations with regional actors, particularly Pakistan?
The importance of these questions stems from the fact that Afghanistan remains at the intersection of the interests of both regional and extra-regional powers, and any change in the military capabilities and political status of the Taliban government could have consequences extending far beyond the country’s borders. On the one hand, Russia faces challenges such as extremist threats, the security of the Central Asian republics, and geopolitical competition with the West. On the other hand, the Taliban government faces a range of security threats and pressures both inside and outside Afghanistan.
Under such circumstances, military cooperation between the two sides cannot be interpreted merely as a technical agreement or limited defense collaboration. Rather, it should be examined within the broader framework of Russia’s security and geopolitical objectives and considerations.
This paper proceeds on the assumption that Russia’s strengthening of the Taliban government’s military capabilities is part of Moscow’s broader strategy to create a stable, resilient, and effective actor in Afghanistan—one capable of containing domestic and regional security threats and preventing instability from spreading into Russia’s periphery. However, this strategy is also accompanied by certain limitations and considerations, as Moscow, while supporting an increase in the Taliban’s capabilities, does not wish to transform the regime into an independent and uncontrollable military power at the regional level.
Accordingly, this article seeks to examine the objectives, dimensions, and limitations of Russia’s policy of militarily strengthening the Taliban and to analyze its implications for Afghanistan’s domestic environment, the regional landscape, and particularly the tense relationship between Afghanistan and Pakistan.
 
Russia and the Taliban's Shared Concern: A Driver of Enhanced Cooperation
The most important factor behind the security convergence between Russia and the Taliban government can be found in the emergence and expansion of the activities of the Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP), a regional branch of the Salafi jihadist group the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). Before the emergence of ISKP in Afghanistan in 2015, Russia’s policy toward the Taliban was largely based on a security-oriented and threat-centered perspective. During that period, Moscow regarded the Taliban as one of the sources of instability in Afghanistan and the wider region and supported U.S. and Afghan government military operations against the group.
However, the rise of ISKP and the expansion of its influence in parts of Afghanistan gradually altered Russia’s security calculations. From Moscow’s perspective, ISKP was not merely a threat to Afghanistan; it also represented a potential danger to the security of Central Asia and, ultimately, Russia’s southern borders. Russia’s primary concern was that Afghanistan could become a base for recruiting, training, and organizing extremist forces and that these forces could penetrate Russia’s traditional sphere of influence through the Central Asian republics.
In such circumstances, the Taliban's entry into a direct and extensive confrontation with ISKP caused Russia's view of the Taliban to gradually transform from a security threat to a deterrent against the spread of ISKP. This transformation paved the way for contacts and interactions between Russia and the Taliban. To manage and legitimize this process, Moscow introduced the Moscow Format dialogue initiative and used it as a mechanism for expanding its engagement with the Taliban. Over time, the level of interaction increased; a trend that was criticized by the former Afghan government as well as by U.S. officials, who accused Russia of developing growing ties with the Taliban.
The Taliban’s return to power in 2021 and its extensive actions against ISKP reinforced Moscow’s belief that the Taliban was, in practice, the most effective force available for containing this threat. As a result, the fight against ISKP became the most significant area of security convergence between Russia and the Taliban, creating the foundation for the expansion of political, security, and ultimately military cooperation between the two sides.
 
Strengthening the Taliban and Narrowing the Space for Armed Opposition
One of the natural consequences of any military cooperation between Russia and the Taliban is the enhancement of the Taliban government’s ability to consolidate its authority within Afghanistan. States and external actors typically provide military support to a government when they view it as an effective instrument for preserving stability and safeguarding their security interests. From this perspective, Russia’s objective is not merely to enhance the Taliban’s combat capabilities against external threats, but also to strengthen its capacity to exercise control across the entirety of Afghan territory.
Within this framework, any increase in the Taliban’s military, intelligence, and logistical capabilities could reduce the operational space available to armed groups opposing the regime. Although anti-Taliban resistance groups do not directly threaten Russian interests or national security and, unlike ISKP, do not possess a transnational agenda, Moscow’s primary concern is not the nature of these groups but rather their impact on the stability of Taliban rule.
At present, Russia views the Taliban as the most important actor capable of preserving Afghanistan’s political and security cohesion. From Moscow’s perspective, any factor that weakens the Taliban government could potentially lead to broader instability. This concern is particularly important because Russia’s understanding of the ISKP threat is shaped by experiences of state collapse in various countries. In Moscow’s view, any erosion of Taliban authority could create new security vacuums that ISKP and other extremist groups would be able to exploit. Therefore, even if resistance groups do not directly threaten Russia, their activities could indirectly create conditions that strengthen Russia’s greatest security concern: the resurgence of ISKP and the spread of insecurity in Afghanistan.
For this reason, Russia is unlikely to draw significant distinctions among different groups opposing the Taliban and will likely prioritize the stability of Taliban rule above other considerations. Within such a calculation, arming and strengthening the Taliban is not only a tool for combating ISKP but also a means of preventing the emergence of any effective military challenge to Taliban authority. Consequently, Russian military support may enable the Taliban to more effectively contain armed opposition groups and prevent the formation of rival power centers—an outcome that Moscow views as part of a broader strategy to preserve stability and prevent the return of extremist threats to Afghanistan.
Of course, this approach rests on a crucial assumption: that the continuation of Taliban rule, despite its challenges, carries lower costs than Afghanistan descending into a new cycle of civil war and the re-emergence of extremist actors. For precisely this reason, Russia may regard the strengthening of the Taliban’s domestic coercive capabilities not as an unintended consequence, but as an integral part of the security rationale underpinning its support for the group.
 
Enhancing the Taliban’s Resilience Against Regional Pressure from Pakistan
One of the less-discussed dimensions of Russia–Taliban military cooperation is its impact on improving the Taliban’s position in the face of external pressures, particularly those originating from Pakistan. At first glance, strengthening the Taliban’s military capabilities vis-à-vis Pakistan may appear unrelated to Russia’s principal objectives, since Moscow neither seeks confrontation with Islamabad nor stands to gain obvious benefits from escalating tensions between Afghanistan and Pakistan.
However, when viewed within the broader context of Russia’s strategy for preserving the stability of Taliban rule, the significance of this issue becomes clearer. In recent years, Russia has accepted the Taliban as the governing authority in Afghanistan and as the principal guarantor of the country’s relative stability. Accordingly, just as Moscow does not wish to see the Taliban weakened by internal challenges and armed opposition groups, it is equally reluctant to see the movement become vulnerable to external pressure. From Russia’s perspective, severe weakening of the Taliban as a result of pressure from a regional actor could produce consequences similar to those generated by domestic instability: diminished state authority, increased insecurity, and opportunities for extremist actors to expand their activities.
Pakistan occupies a unique position in this regard. Owing to its considerable military capabilities, historical influence in Afghanistan, cross-border ethnic and religious ties, and capacity to influence various armed groups, Pakistan is one of the few actors capable of exerting significant strategic pressure on the Taliban. Meanwhile, disputes over the Durand Line, the issue of the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), border clashes, and reciprocal attacks have demonstrated that relations between the two sides have entered a phase of sustained tension.
Under these circumstances, Russia has likely concluded that the stability of the Taliban government depends not only on its ability to contain internal threats but also on its resilience against external pressure. From this perspective, part of the rationale behind strengthening the Taliban militarily can be interpreted as an effort to create a minimum level of deterrent capability and endurance against regional threats. 
The purpose of such deterrence is not necessarily to establish Taliban military superiority over Pakistan; such an objective would neither be realistic nor compatible with Russia’s strategic considerations. Rather, the goal is to ensure that the Taliban possesses sufficient capacity to prevent external actors from imposing their will upon it and to avoid rapid erosion and instability in the face of military or security pressure.
Russian military assistance can therefore be viewed as an effort to increase the Taliban’s “strategic resilience”—a resilience that functions against both internal challenges and external pressures. Within this framework, Pakistan is not seen as an adversary of Russia, but rather as one of the variables influencing the stability or instability of Taliban rule. Consequently, Moscow may regard the strengthening of the Taliban’s defensive capabilities as a tool for preserving balance and preventing the group from becoming excessively vulnerable to regional pressure. From Russia’s perspective, a government that lacks deterrent capacity against external threats will ultimately become vulnerable to internal challenges as well.
 
Russia’s Regional and International Considerations Regarding the Military Strengthening of the Taliban
Although Russia supports the strengthening of the Taliban’s military capabilities, this support should not be viewed as unlimited or devoid of strategic considerations. In reality, Moscow’s objective in pursuing military cooperation with the Taliban is not to transform Afghanistan into a regional military power or to create a completely independent and uncontrollable ally. Russia needs a stronger Taliban to advance its security objectives, but it also remains cautious about the long-term consequences of an excessive increase in the group’s power.
Consequently, Russia’s policy of militarizing the Taliban is guided by a dual logic: strengthening the group to the extent necessary for maintaining stability, but not to the point where it becomes an uncontrollable actor. This consideration is rooted in the historical experiences of Russia and other major powers. In many cases, groups or governments that were once supported as security partners eventually acquired extensive military capabilities, pursued independent objectives and priorities, and even became challenges to their former sponsors. From this perspective, Moscow is fully aware that an unconditional expansion of the Taliban’s military capabilities could, in the future, extend the group’s influence and freedom of action beyond Russia’s current strategic calculations.
Moreover, a significant part of Russia’s security rationale for cooperating with the Taliban is linked to the threat posed by ISKP and the necessity of countering it. As long as ISKP remains an active threat in Afghanistan and its surrounding region, strengthening the Taliban serves a clear security function from Russia’s perspective. However, if this threat is eventually neutralized, either completely or to a substantial degree, the security equation will also change.
Under such circumstances, a Taliban equipped with extensive military capabilities may no longer be viewed merely as an instrument of stability but could itself become a significant factor influencing regional security balances. This concern is particularly relevant with regard to Central Asia. Russia considers the security of Central Asia an integral component of its own strategic security and has consistently been sensitive to the emergence of powerful and unpredictable military actors in the region’s vicinity.
Although the Taliban currently pursues a policy of non-interference in neighboring countries, there is no guarantee that this approach will remain unchanged over the long term under different regional circumstances. Therefore, Moscow prefers to maintain a balance between the need to strengthen the Taliban and the necessity of preventing the emergence of an independent military power in Afghanistan.
Accordingly, it can be expected that Russia’s military support for the Taliban will be subject to specific ceilings and limitations. Moscow is likely to expand cooperation with the Taliban government in areas such as training, technical assistance, equipment maintenance, intelligence capacity-building, and the enhancement of counterterrorism capabilities. However, it will likely exercise greater caution when it comes to transferring capabilities that could fundamentally alter the regional balance of power.
In essence, Russia’s objective is to create a “stable and resilient” Taliban, not a “dominant and hegemonic” Taliban. This subtle distinction represents one of Moscow’s most important strategic considerations in the process of strengthening the Taliban militarily and demonstrates that Russia’s policy is focused less on maximizing the Taliban’s power and more on managing and controlling the level of that power.
 
Conclusion
Russia’s objective in strengthening and equipping the Taliban militarily should be analyzed within the framework of Moscow’s redefinition of the group’s role in its new strategy toward Afghanistan. Whereas Russia once regarded the Taliban as a threat to regional security, it now views the movement as the most important actor capable of ensuring stability in Afghanistan.
Within this framework, the military strengthening of the Taliban constitutes part of Moscow’s broader effort to fill the security vacuum left by the withdrawal of the United States, safeguard the security of the Central Asian republics, maintain effective oversight of developments in Afghanistan, and prevent the return of Western influence to the country.
At the domestic level, Russia seeks, through the enhancement of the Taliban’s military capabilities, to increase the group’s capacity to confront security threats, particularly ISKP and other destabilizing factors. This approach may also contribute to consolidating the authority of the Taliban government and restricting the operational space of armed opposition groups. From Moscow’s perspective, the weakening of the central authority in Afghanistan could create conditions for the resurgence of extremist movements and the spread of insecurity throughout the region.
At the regional level, Russia also seeks to enhance the Taliban’s defensive capabilities in order to increase the group’s resilience against external pressures, particularly those originating from Pakistan. Moscow’s objective in this regard is not to provide the Taliban with military superiority, but rather to ensure a minimum level of deterrence and resilience so that the Taliban government does not become vulnerable to erosion and instability under regional pressure.
Nevertheless, Russia’s strategy toward the Taliban is accompanied by important considerations. Just as Moscow sees a need to strengthen the Taliban, it is also concerned about the consequences of the group becoming excessively powerful. For this reason, Russia has no desire to see the Taliban acquire a level of military capability that could eventually transform it into an independent and uncontrollable regional power.
Accordingly, Russia’s policy can be understood as an effort to strike a balance between “strengthening” and “containing” the Taliban—strengthening the group sufficiently to ensure stability in Afghanistan and security in Russia’s surrounding region, but not to such an extent that it itself becomes a new security challenge for the region and for Moscow’s long-term interests.