Introduction
The starting point was Kazakhstan’s accession to the Abraham Accords in November 2025. This development is reinforced by concrete figures: Kazakhstan’s trade turnover with Israel reached $162 million in the first quarter of 2025; Uzbekistan’s copper exports to Israel doubled; Israeli delegations have increased their visits to countries in the region; Israel opened an embassy in Ashgabat; and Israeli drones have been used in military exercises conducted in Kazakhstan.
But is this “Israeli peace” truly beneficial for the region? Or are economic incentives and commercial opportunities merely serving as a mask to conceal a Trojan Horse [1], depriving the region of its multi-vector foreign policy and strategic independence? This article examines the instruments, motivations, and consequences of expanding Israeli influence in Central Asia, while assessing the resulting threats to Iran, Russia, China, and Central Asia itself.
 
Instruments of Influence: how Israel enters Central Asia?
Economic track: figures, Deals, and Dependencies
The economy serves as Israel’s principal battering ram [2] for expanding its influence in Central Asia. Trade and investment create networks of mutual interests that become increasingly difficult to dismantle without significant costs. Tel Aviv follows a selective strategy by targeting sectors where it enjoys technological or logistical advantages, thereby integrating Central Asian economies into Israel regime’s system. In other words, these countries are gradually drawn into a system of dependence and coordination with Tel Aviv, where their economic interests and activities increasingly align with Israeli objectives. Examples include:

1. Uzbekistan’s copper footprint
During the first half of 2025, Uzbekistan’s copper exports to Israel nearly doubled, reaching $7 million, compared to $3.8 million during the same period in 2024. In effect, Uzbekistan is replacing Turkey, whose domestic demand has reduced its copper exports. Copper is a strategic resource for the electronics, defense, and construction industries. Uzbekistan’s Almalyk Mining and Metallurgical Combine represents an ideal supplier because of its efficient logistics through the Caspian and Black Seas and the relatively low political risk involved. The relevant contracts were concluded through traders based in the United Arab Emirates in order to avoid provoking sensitivities in Iran and Turkey.

2. Kazakhstan’s Oil Dependency
Israel imports 90 percent of its oil. Kazakhstan supplies 22–25 percent of Israel’s crude oil imports—approximately 2.8 million metric tons annually. Until 2022, Russia and Azerbaijan were Israel’s principal crude oil suppliers. Following the war in Ukraine, however, Tel Aviv shifted its focus toward Kazakhstan. Oil is transported through the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC) to Novorossiysk and then shipped by tanker to Haifa and Ashdod. In November 2025, the two countries signed a memorandum of understanding to increase annual oil supplies to 3.5 million metric tons beginning in 2026. As a result, Kazakhstan is on track to become Israel’s second-largest oil supplier )after Azerbaijan with an estimated 30 percent share), while Russia would fall to third place (below 15 percent).

3. Trade turnover and investments
During the first quarter of 2025, trade between Kazakhstan and Israel reached $162 million, representing a 34 percent increase over 2024. By the end of 2026, bilateral trade is projected to reach $700–750 million. Meanwhile, Israel’s cumulative investment in Kazakhstan over the past two decades amounts to approximately $500 million. These investments are concentrated not in raw materials but in advanced technologies, including irrigation (Netafim) [3], cybersecurity (Checkpoint has opened an office in Almaty), and agricultural technologies. This has contributed to the emergence of a network of business elites who lobby in favor of Israeli interests.

4. Israeli Companies in Azerbaijan: A Launching Pad for Expansion into Central Asia
A total of 124 Israeli companies operate in Azerbaijan, generating an annual turnover of $350–400 million. Many of these firms, which have manufacturing facilities (drone and optical systems assembly(, use Azerbaijan as a base for entering Central Asian markets. In January 2026, discussions were held regarding the establishment of a joint Israeli-Kazakh irrigation systems venture in Astana utilizing Azerbaijani logistics. In effect, Baku is becoming a hub for projecting Israeli influence deeper into Eurasia.

Military-Technical Cooperation: Invisible Militarization
Military cooperation between Israel and Kazakhstan began in 2001, including purchases of missile systems and drones from Elbit Systems [4], Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI) [5], and Rafael [6]. In 2021, assembly of Israeli Skylark I-LEX drones began in Kazakhstan. These drones were first deployed alongside Turkey’s Anka attack drones during the Combat Commonwealth-2025 exercises of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO).
The Abraham Accords pave the way for expanded military procurement, ranging from air defense systems to reconnaissance equipment. According to SIPRI [7] data, Israeli arms exports to Central Asia increased by 40 percent during 2024–2025. One of the principal reasons is Tel Aviv’s greater confidence in the armed forces of Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan than in those of Egypt or Saudi Arabia. From Israel’s perspective, Astana and Baku are viewed as reliable partners in any future confrontation with Iran.

Diplomatic Progress: The Quiet Eastward Expansion of the Abraham Accords
Kazakhstan is the first Central Asian country to join the Abraham Accords in November 2025. Uzbekistan and Azerbaijan are considered the next likely candidates. In October 2025, the Speaker of the Knesset visited Tashkent in what marked the first visit of its kind. In December 2025, Israel inaugurated its embassy in Ashgabat, making Turkmenistan the fourth Central Asian country—after Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan—to host an Israeli diplomatic mission. According to Israeli media, this embassy performs intelligence-related functions and monitors Iranian activities.
At the same time, discussions are underway regarding the creation of a 6+2C framework (Central Asia and the United States + Israel and Azerbaijan) focused on rare earth minerals and security. This is an Israeli initiative backed by the United States. If implemented, it would grant Israel an institutional presence in the regional agenda alongside Russia, China, and the United States.
 
Israel’s Strategic Motivations: What Does Tel Aviv Really want?
Israel’s expansion into Central Asia represents a systematic strategy driven by three principal objectives: containing Iran, overcoming diplomatic isolation, and expanding Access to resources.

containing Iran
The Iranian factor is the primary driver. Tel Aviv views Central Asia as the “northern front” surrounding Iran. The opening of its embassy in Turkmenistan could lead to intensified intelligence monitoring along the Iran-Turkmenistan border, including surveillance of missile ranges and transportation corridors. Support for Iran’s ethnic minorities—including Kurds, Baluch, and Ahwazi Arabs—through intermediaries in the United Arab Emirates and Pakistan also serves as an instrument for destabilizing Iran.
Central Asian countries and Azerbaijan are increasingly distancing themselves from Tehran’s anti-Israel agenda. At the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) Summit in Astana (July 2025), Iran’s proposal to condemn Israel failed to receive sufficient support. This development weakens Iran’s influence on its northern flank.

Overcoming Diplomatic Legitimacy
The Gaza war (2023–2025) further intensified Israel’s diplomatic isolation. Central Asia is becoming a platform through which Israel seeks to restore its international legitimacy. Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan—the only countries in the region maintaining embassies in Israel—are contributing to this effort. Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are also discussing the possibility of opening diplomatic missions in Israel. Notably, the Speaker of the Knesset’s visit to Uzbekistan took place amid Iran’s diplomatic silence.

Expanding Access to Resources
Israeli technologies—including irrigation, desalination, and cybersecurity—are being introduced through the MASHAV agency. Since 2024, 12 projects have been launched in Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan. However, Tel Aviv’s primary interest lies in natural resources. Kazakhstan ranks first globally in uranium production (accounting for 12 percent of global output) and is among the world’s top ten producers of gold and rare earth elements. Uzbekistan is likewise a major gold producer. Securing access to these resources through long-term contracts is a strategic priority for Israel.
 
For Which Countries Is Israel a “Trojan Horse”?
For Iran, Israel’s growing presence in Central Asia represents a blow to its northern flank. Israeli activities in Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, and Azerbaijan create an intelligence environment. Israel’s embassy in Ashgabat serves as a base for monitoring Iran’s missile capabilities. In addition, an early-warning radar is reportedly scheduled for deployment in Kazakhstan in 2026, posing a direct challenge to Iran’s air defense system. In the meanwhile, support for ethnic minorities and the abandonment of Tehran’s anti-Israel agenda by Central Asian countries further weaken Iran.

For Russia, Israel’s expanding influence in Central Asia signifies the erosion of its “near abroad.” Kazakhstan’s accession to the Abraham Accords weakens both the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) and the CSTO. Israel’s $500 million investments and its growing military engagement provide an alternative source of regional influence. Furthermore, proposed oil and gas projects bypassing Russian pipeline networks represent potential competitors to Gazprom and Rosneft. Moscow currently lacks any real countermeasures.

For China, Israel’s activities are also a source of concern. Beijing closely monitors Israeli involvement and fears surveillance of Chinese infrastructure projects, such as the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Since 2025, Chinese media have begun discussing the “Mossad factor” and expressing concern. Israel’s interest in Kazakhstan’s uranium and Uzbekistan’s gold directly affects resources that China considers strategically important. Proxy conflicts along transportation corridors also create risks for China’s logistics network.
Thus far, none of these three major powers has managed to formulate a coordinated response, creating opportunities for Israel. At the same time, Central Asian countries themselves face the risk of becoming a battlefield—a threat that represents the greatest danger.
 
Threats to Central Asia: Why It Is Time to Fear the “Israeli Peace”
Being drawn into a proxy war is a principal threat. Israeli facilities in Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan could become legitimate targets for Iranian retaliation. In 2025, Iran warned Astana and Ashgabat against hosting Israeli infrastructure. Central Asian officials justify closer ties with Israel as a counterbalance to Islamist movements, but this amounts to “playing with fire.” According to a Gallup Central Asia (2025) survey, 68 percent of Kazakhs and 72 percent of Uzbeks hold negative views of Israel’s actions in Gaza. This could undermine the legitimacy of their governing elites.

Another consequence is the erosion of Central Asia’s traditional multi-vector foreign policy. Historically, the region has sought to balance relations among Russia, China, Turkey, and the West. Deepening ties with Israel effectively amounts to “choosing the United States through the back door,” since these initiatives are coordinated with Washington. As a result, the region risks losing its freedom of maneuver and facing difficult choices among competing centers of power.

A further concern is hidden militarization. Although Skylark I-LEX drones are assembled in Kazakhstan, their key components and software remain under Israeli control, creating a classic “compatibility trap.” Joint military exercises and intelligence sharing also establish institutional ties that are difficult to reverse, gradually integrating Central Asia into Israel’s security architecture.
 
Conclusion and Key Takeaways: Time to Act
Israel’s expansion into Central Asia constitutes a long-term strategic operation aimed at establishing a belt of influence along Russia’s southern borders, China’s western frontier, and Iran’s northern perimeter. Economic agreements, military contracts, and diplomatic initiatives undertaken between 2024 and 2026 are shaping a new reality.
The key conclusion is that the “Israeli peace” constitutes a Trojan Horse. Short-term gains may ultimately result in the loss of strategic independence, involvement in external conflicts, and dependence on Israel’s military-technical infrastructure. For Iran, this represents a direct threat to its northern borders, while for Russia and China it signifies a gradual erosion of their regional influence.

What should be done? Passive observation is no longer acceptable. Iran, Russia, and China share common interests in containing Israeli influence, yet they continue to act in an uncoordinated manner. It is therefore necessary to establish a permanent expert and analytical platform to monitor Israeli activities, exchange intelligence, and formulate coordinated countermeasures ranging from economic initiatives (alternative investments, and blocking transactions) to diplomatic measures (joint statements, and limiting the status of Israeli diplomatic missions).
Time is running out for the region. Every new agreement with Israel represents another step that will be increasingly difficult to reverse. If the countries of Central Asia fail to recognize the cost of the “Israeli peace,” they may ultimately pay for it with their stability and independence.