Introduction
Five years have passed since the Taliban returned to power in Afghanistan. This period provides an appropriate opportunity to examine the performance of the Taliban government and assess the extent of its success in governing the country. During this period, the Taliban government has pursued various policies and demonstrated different patterns of performance in both domestic and foreign affairs. These policies and actions require examination in order to assess the government’s current condition and future prospects.

Accordingly, this article examines the Taliban government’s five-year record in several key areas. In the legal-political sphere, issues such as legitimacy, the legal framework, the structure and distribution of power, political stability, and the relationship between the government and society are considered. In the socio-cultural sphere, issues such as the state of education, women, social freedoms, the media, civil society, and social cohesion are examined. In the security sphere, issues relating to military capabilities, territorial control, the provision of security, and efforts to counter armed threats are assessed. In the economic sphere, trade, production, mining, infrastructure, sources of revenue, inflation, economic growth, and unemployment are examined.

Based on the overall picture provided by these indicators, an assessment of the Taliban government’s five-year record and its future prospects can be presented.
 
The Legal-Political and Diplomatic section in the Taliban Governance
A) Legal
In terms of political legitimacy, the Taliban government could not or did not want to create a legitimizing basis for itself in the last five years. Five years on, the government still lacks a constitution, and as can be observed from the existing legislative process, no steps have been taken to draft one. Beyond the constitutional issue, the Taliban, relying on its particular interpretation of Sharia and Hanafi jurisprudence, abolished all previous laws and introduced a unilateral, top-down process of lawmaking. Through mechanisms such as the Ministry for the Propagation of Virtue and Prevention of Vice, it supervises the unconditional implementation of these unilateral laws. This method of legislation and the supervisory mechanism are carried out in a way that does not ensure equality of all communities before the law, and in a situation where the judicial system is not independent.

B) Political
In the political sphere, particularly with regard to the structure of power, the Taliban has adopted a highly centralized approach, with power concentrated entirely in the hands of the leadership and circles close to the leadership. In terms of composition, the government is single-factional, and after five years the degree of inclusion of other ethnic, religious, and social groups is almost zero. No political party is permitted to operate, and even civil institutions, which are necessary in any society, are not allowed to function; no activity takes place outside the frameworks defined by the Ministry of Justice.

In terms of political stability, the Taliban government can be assessed from two perspectives. From one perspective, the Taliban has succeeded in creating political stability. Despite some dissatisfaction among senior officials and members of the government, internal cohesion within the movement has been preserved. Moreover, internal critics of the Taliban leadership who were active two years ago have now been marginalized or silenced. Based on this assessment, the cohesion of the political structure has been maintained, and the possibility of a sudden change through a coup or internal uprising appears to be almost nonexistent. From another perspective, however, several factors remain that could contribute to the system’s destabilization in the future.

The first factor is the issue of succession within the Taliban power structure. The concentration of power in the hands of the leadership, the lack of a structured explanation of power in formal and established institutions, and the lack of a recognized mechanism for succession are characteristics that, in the event of the leadership’s departure for any reason, place the continued cohesion of the internal structure at risk. Therefore, if the leadership be removed through any means, the possibility of a political crisis would be considerable.
In addition, the lack of institutionalized rule of law, the existence of hidden competition among the system’s political elites, and uprisings by some internal elements, whether in the form of political or military movements—as recently witnessed in Badakhshan Province— along with the lack of inclusiveness and the one-dimensional nature of the system’s structure and composition are among the other destabilizing factors.

Another important issue is the relationship between the state and society, or political-social cohesion, which is considered an important factor in assessing the political stability of states. In this regard, the assumption is that the more cohesive and aligned the relationship between the state and society is, the greater the degree of state stability.

In this respect, the Taliban government has had a negative record over the past five years. An examination of indicators such as public political participation, the provision of civil liberties, the existence of an active civil society capable of monitoring the government, and the presence of independent and critical media in Afghanistan shows that the Taliban government has moved in the opposite direction on all of these issues. Within the Taliban government, not only has political participation outside the movement’s internal circle failed to emerge, but even within the government itself, a policy of homogenization has been applied. This policy has done through removing employees of the previous government, including at lower levels of the administrative structure; No political or quasi-political activity has been recognized, and even institutions active in the religious sphere have been shut down.

A prominent example is the closure of all activities of the organization known as Jamiat-e Eslah. Although the Taliban government has permitted media activity, such activity is subject to very strict supervision. Only media outlets that are aligned with Taliban policies are allowed to operate. Civil liberties, particularly regarding women’s activities both in education and within government institutions, have been severely restricted, and over the past five years, numerous strict laws have been introduced in this area. The enactment of strict religious regulations as well as the mandate of the Ministry for the Propagation of Virtue and Prevention of Vice to control people's religious behaviors have created a kind of social restriction, in order to impose a particular Taliban-preferred lifestyle on the population.

C) Diplomacy and Foreign Relations
In contrast to the domestic sphere, the Taliban government’s record in foreign policy and international relations has been relatively positive. Although the government still lacks a codified foreign policy based on legal and political frameworks approved by formal institutions, an examination of its practical performance over the past five years indicates positive steps in engaging with other countries. With regard to its relations with great powers, the Taliban government has managed to maintain a relative balance.
Although, on the surface, the Taliban government’s relations with Russia and China appear close, it has also pursued a cooperative approach toward the United States through unofficial and mediated channels—including Qatar—and primarily through intelligence channels.

In relations with neighboring countries—with the exception of Pakistan—the Taliban government’s record is more brilliant. Although none of Afghanistan’s neighboring states has formally recognized the Taliban government, in practical terms, very close and friendly interaction has developed between the Taliban government and its neighbors. Diplomatic representatives have been exchanged at the ambassadorial level with most neighboring countries, while political relations have been strengthened through visits by officials from neighboring states, including prime ministers, foreign ministers, and other senior officials.

Beyond the neighboring countries, the Taliban government’s engagement with India, which is highly significant, has moved toward greater alignment. The Persian Gulf states have established close engagement with the Taliban government, while Turkey has also maintained close and cooperative relations with it. In Europe, some countries have cautiously engaged with the Taliban government and, in addition to coordinating on migration issues, several diplomatic missions in a number of European countries have been handed over to the Taliban to provide consular services. The positive behavior of other countries toward the Taliban government has been driven by several factors, including the group's efforts to create economic interdependence as well as its considerable ability to secure mutual interests through diplomacy and—except in the case of Pakistan—the de-securitization of relations.

Nevertheless, during the past five years, no country — even those that maintain the closest engagement with the Taliban government— has formally recognized it (except Russia). Moreover, United Nations and U.S. sanctions have not been lifted, and Afghanistan remains under broad international isolation.

As noted earlier, in terms of relations with foreign countries, the Taliban government’s only clearly negative record has been in its relations with Pakistan. Contrary to the prevailing perception stemming from the historically close relationship between the two sides, relations between the Taliban and Pakistan deteriorated over the issue of Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and the Taliban’s expanding engagement with India. This deterioration eventually led to several border clashes and Pakistani airstrikes on Kabul and, for several months now, to the complete closure of the border crossings between the two countries.

Although the Taliban government has managed to somewhat reduce its vulnerability to the severing of economic ties with Pakistan—through diversifying its transit routes and gaining access to Iran’s seaports— the Taliban’s tensions with Pakistan are more important than its relations with any other country; because, as historical evidence confirms, Pakistan possesses a unique capacity to destabilize the situation in Afghanistan.
 
The Security Section in the Taliban Governance
In the security sphere, the five-year performance of the Taliban government has been relatively positive. Following the Taliban’s return to power, the government faced two types of threats: one was the threat posed by Islamic State of Khorasan Province (ISKP), and the other was the threat posed by politically opposed groups. After coming to power, the Taliban rapidly consolidated its fragmented military organization into three branches: the police, operating under the Ministry of Interior; the armed forces, operating under the Ministry of Defense; and the intelligence service, operating under the General Directorate of Intelligence. This consolidation, supported by the large quantities of modern weapons and equipment left behind by the previous government, soon became operational.

By using these remaining weapons and equipment, together with experienced battlefield personnel, the Taliban government was able not only to provide security throughout Afghanistan, but also to suppress opposing forces. What is particularly important in this regard is the suppression and dismantling of ISKP in Afghanistan. This campaign transformed ISKP from an organized threat that at one point controlled territory in parts of Afghanistan into a small-scale group with the capacity to carry out limited and sporadic suicide attacks.

Although the number of other political opposition groups to the Taliban has increased significantly outside Afghanistan over the past five years, during this period, none of them— except the National Resistance Front (NRF) led by Ahmad Massoud and the Afghanistan Freedom Front (AFF) led by Yasin Zia, a former military officer—has had any significant activity inside Afghanistan. These two groups have also employed the tactic of sporadic attacks on military outposts, mostly in a limited manner, and more recently, the AFF has managed to organize several attacks on Taliban positions in Zebak District of Badakhshan Province.  

In addition, on the eve of the Taliban government’s fifth anniversary, a newly established group known as the Sepahiyan-e-Mihan (Homeland Soldiers) managed to wrest control of the Yaftal district center from the Taliban for several hours. At the same time, the uprising of some Taliban insiders, which currently has only one notable example—the rebellion of the Tajik Taliban commander in Badakhshan—has also attracted attention. However, this factor does not appear capable of posing a threat to Taliban rule in the province; because, first, his rebellion was not a withdrawal from the Taliban Emirate but rather a protest against discrimination and the dominance of Pashtun Taliban in Badakhshan; and second, this commander lacks the capacity to withstand the large forces arrayed against him, unless he forms an alliance with other political opposition groups, which even then he cannot be considered a serious threat.

Although the developments described above can be regarded as destabilizing factors, none of them—not ISKP, despite the exaggeration of its threat by external actors; not the political opposition groups to the Taliban government; and not dissatisfied elements within the Taliban itself—can be considered an existential threat to the Taliban, given the consolidation and organizational strength of the movement, the logistical support available to it, and the domestic resources used to finance its military forces.

Over the past five years, the Taliban government has made substantial investments in strengthening its military capabilities. during these five years, the Taliban has mobilized thousands of trained combat personnel across the three branches of its armed forces It has also tightened border controls, strengthened military zones and established fortified, layered military outposts across remote areas, supported by rapid access through the construction of hundreds of kilometers of roads.

Overall, an examination of indicators such as the number of integrated, loyal, and motivated personnel under a unified command; possession of the weapons and military equipment left behind by the previous government; development of military infrastructure and strengthening of military fortifications; development of drone technology, although it remains at a very rudimentary level; and logistical support financed from domestic and local resources, shows that over the past five years the Taliban government has strengthened itself militarily in preparation for sustaining its rule over a prolonged period.
 
Afghanistan’s Economy During Five Years of Taliban Rule
In the economic sphere, an examination of indicators such as foreign trade, domestic production, mining, economic infrastructure development, diversification of economic partners, tax collection, sources of government expenditure, inflation, foreign exchange controls, economic growth, and unemployment presents a different picture. In the area of foreign trade, the Taliban’s principal policy has been to diversify sources of supply and focus on achieving economic self-sufficiency wherever possible through the development of economic infrastructure. Accordingly, Afghanistan’s foreign trade reached approximately $14 billion in 2025. Although most of this volume consisted of imports and a deep trade deficit persisted between exports and imports, the Taliban government also managed to record a $2 billion export figure, which is a significant achievement.

In terms of infrastructure development, in addition to reconstructing major highways, which has helped facilitate foreign trade and the movement of goods domestically, the Taliban government has taken notable steps in areas such as the construction of water canals (the most prominent example being the Qosh Tepa Canal), the launch of the construction of TAPI project (under which dozens of kilometers of pipeline have so far been laid inside Afghanistan), electricity-generation development projects, including a $10 billion agreement with the private sector, and the resumption of construction work on the CASA-1000 electricity transmission project—although this latter effort is being funded by foreign sources—as well as the reconstruction of production facilities such as cement plants.

Although domestic production in Afghanistan remains weak and the country continues to rely heavily on imports, the Taliban government has provided numerous incentives to investors to expand domestic production. As a result, domestic output has followed an upward trend, the impact of which can also be seen in the growth of exports. Among these economic activities, what stands out most prominently is the expansion of Afghanistan’s mining sector. By inviting domestic and foreign investors, the Taliban has increased the extraction of Afghanistan’s mineral resources on an unprecedented scale. According to available statistics, over the past five years, more than 200 large and small contracts have been signed in Afghanistan for the extraction of oil, gold, emeralds, coal, and other minerals, with a total value of several billion dollars. For example, over the past five years the Taliban has managed to increase oil production by more than fivefold, to the point that around 10 percent of the country’s needs are now supplied domestically.

Diversifying economic partners is another component of the Taliban’s economic policy. In this regard, the Taliban’s principal objectives have been, on the one hand, to diversify the sources from which imported goods are supplied and, on the other, to reduce transit dependence on Pakistan. In this context, Afghanistan’s foreign trade with Iran, Central Asia, China, India, Russia, and the Arab states has experienced growth. Likewise, with regard to reducing dependence on Pakistani routes, Afghanistan has established land connectivity with China, expanded economic engagement with Russia and Turkey through land routes (via Central Asia and Iran), and made extensive use of Iranian ports, particularly the port of Chabahar, as an alternative.

With regard to financing government expenditures, although the Taliban Ministry of Finance has not disclosed the size of the budget or the level of its deficit over the past three years, available evidence indicates that financing the budget from domestic resources is a government priority. Regular tax collection, revenues generated through mining, and revenues collected at ports have been identified as the principal sources of budget financing. According to officials of the Taliban Ministry of Finance, in the past two or three years the entire government budget has been financed from domestic resources.

In terms of inflation and the exchange rate of foreign currencies against Afghanistan’s national currency (Afghani), Afghanistan has recorded relatively favorable figures. Apart from a dangerous surge during the first and second years of Taliban rule, over approximately the past three years the Taliban government has managed to exercise effective control over inflation and maintain the stability of the Afghani. Although inflation control and the stability of the Afghani are sometimes attributed to several factors—including the delivery of dollar cash shipments to Kabul, international assistance to Afghanistan, and remittances sent to the country— the Taliban government’s own regulatory and control policies in this area cannot be overlooked.

The Taliban’s central bank, Da Afghanistan Bank, has been able to keep inflation negative or very low and preserve the value of the Afghani to a considerable extent by imposing strict restrictions on the outflow of foreign currency, banning the use of foreign currencies such as the rupee and dollar in domestic transactions, and regularly supplying dollars to the market.

With regard to Afghanistan’s economic growth, the available statistics are also relatively positive, with Afghanistan experiencing convincing growth for two consecutive years. However, reports on unemployment and poverty remain negative. According to foreign sources as well as objective assessments of the economic conditions of the Afghan population, the economy of ordinary people remains at a very low level, while unemployment and poverty continue to be widespread across Afghanistan. Overall, the general assessment of Afghanistan’s economy during the five years of Taliban rule contains many positive features, and in light of current conditions and future trends, its outlook appears relatively optimistic.

Conclusion and Outlook
An assessment of the Taliban government’s five-year performance in the legal-political, socio-cultural, security, economic, and foreign-relations spheres shows that its record is a combination of significant achievements in consolidating power and fundamental shortcomings in institutionalizing inclusive governance.

Politically, through the absolute concentration of power and preservation of internal cohesion, the Taliban has managed to establish a degree of stability; in the security sphere, through the organization of its military structure and effective suppression of ISKP and opposition groups, it has succeeded in exercising broad control over the country’s territory.
In the economic sphere, significant increases in foreign trade, the development of infrastructure such as the Qosh Tepa Canal and the launch of the TAPI project, the expansion of mining, and effective control over inflation and the exchange rate are considered positive achievements; although widespread unemployment and deep poverty remain unresolved challenges in this area.

In foreign relations, despite the absence of formal recognition and the continuation of sanctions, the Taliban has established close practical relations with most neighboring countries other than Pakistan—where border tensions and the closure of ports and crossings have occurred—and has activated alternative transit routes through Iran and Central Asia. However, the absence of a constitution, the elimination of political and social participation, the closure of civil institutions, severe restrictions on women’s education and activities, and the lack of an inclusive structure remain major obstacles to achieving legitimacy and long-term stability.

Accordingly, the Taliban’s current stability rests less on participatory institutions than on the movement’s internal cohesion and military capabilities. However, the continuation of this stability over the long term will depend on addressing a set of fundamental challenges: in the political sphere, drafting a constitution, establishing a transparent mechanism for leadership succession, and opening political participation to ethnic groups and political parties; in the social sphere, removing restrictions on women’s education and employment, reviving civil institutions, and guaranteeing media freedom; in foreign affairs, achieving international legitimacy through reform of existing practices, and managing the tensions with Pakistan; and in the economic sphere, addressing unemployment and poverty through the expansion of domestic production, reducing heavy dependence on imports, and ensuring transparent exploitation of mineral resources.

It is evident that neglecting any of these indicators could, in the medium term, expose the government’s internal cohesion to serious threats and create further uncertainty regarding its future prospects.