Recent security developments in Tajikistan, involving attacks on border forces and foreign citizens, signal the emergence of a complex threat behind which the conflicting interests of regional and extra-regional actors and geopolitical rivalries can be observed. In order to analyze this issue and the possible consequences of these developments for the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Central Asia Working Group of the Institute for East Strategic Studies (IESS) conducted an exclusive interview with one of Tajikistan’s experts on regional and Afghan affairs whose name is withheld due to personal considerations. The text of this conversation is as follows:

• IESS: What operational and executive differences do the recent terrorist attacks in Tajikistan- Afghanistan border have compared to previous attacks?

Answer: A comparative review of recent attacks and security tensions along Tajikistan’s borders with earlier periods shows that these developments have been pursued according to a specific plan and objectives, and in several aspects they have significant differences from past cases.
First, in temporal terms, recent attacks have been accompanied by a notable increase in frequency and repetition rate, which may indicate a transition from sporadic actions to a more coherent operational pattern. Second, the level of human casualties has increased at this stage, and for the first time foreign citizens—especially Chinese workers—have been directly targeted alongside Tajikistan’s border forces. It indicates a change in target selection and the strategic messaging of the attackers. Third, in the past, most cases of border violations between the two countries were limited to the activities of armed smugglers. However, recent attacks have clearly had a terrorist nature, which has led even official and state media in Tajikistan to explicitly use the term “terrorism” to describe these incidents.
Fourth, available evidence suggests that at this stage terrorist groups have not merely sought to create temporary insecurity, but are conducting field assessments of their strategic objectives. These objectives may include examining the feasibility of infiltration via the Amu River route, measuring the mobility and strategic defensive capacity of Tajikistan’s forces, evaluating the human and technological preparedness of Tajikistan’s border system, and assessing the capabilities of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) forces.
Moreover, it appears that at this stage, terrorists have also tested the possibility of establishing local support networks, concealing operational elements, and even stockpiling weapons for future operations.

• IESS: what have been the causes and strategic motivations behind the recent attacks?

Answer: Analysis of the motives behind these attacks shows that terrorist groups present in Afghanistan regard Tajikistan as the main gateway for penetration into Central Asia. At present, the government’s strict security policy—and in particular the firm and uncompromising stance of Emomali Rahmon, President of Tajikistan, toward extremist and terrorist groups—has turned our country into a serious barrier against the expansion of terrorism’s influence in the region.
 Accordingly, destabilizing Tajikistan’s security at the current juncture has become a strategic priority for these groups, and the country’s potential vulnerabilities have been assessed in a targeted manner. Although, at later stages, other countries such as Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Kazakhstan may also be exposed to threats, under current conditions Tajikistan constitutes the main axis of executing the scenario of penetration into Central Asia.

• IESS: How do you assess the interests and roles of various actors within the context of these border tensions?

Answer: Behind these developments, there are indications of the indirect involvement of certain powerful regional and extra-regional actors who, through interaction with or tolerance of terrorist group activities, provide a kind of operational immunity for them.
The targeting of Chinese citizens can be analyzed within the framework of efforts to prevent the expansion of China’s economic influence and Beijing’s related projects in Afghanistan and Central Asia. From this perspective, destabilizing the environment surrounding China’s economic projects is considered part of the geopolitical competition among powers in the region.
In addition, some actors hold a negative stance toward improving relations between Tajikistan and the Taliban and, in this regard, use the creation of insecurity as a tool to contain this trend.

• IESS: What security and geopolitical consequences could these events have for Tajikistan’s bilateral and multilateral relations (with Russia and China)?

Answer: The recent attacks will clearly affect Tajikistan’s bilateral and multilateral relations with Russia and China. These two countries are Tajikistan’s most important strategic partners in the economic and security spheres, and help secure Tajikistan’s borders with Afghanistan, both through bilateral relations and within the framework of regional integration organizations. 
It appears that the recent attacks will further strengthen cooperation in this area. From a strategic perspective, it is clear that the target of terrorist groups is not only Tajikistan; rather, in the first stage of these objectives stand China and Russia. Therefore, Moscow and Beijing must pay more serious attention to Tajikistan’s border security issues.
At the same time, Russia and China have also established pragmatic and calculated working relations with the Taliban. Given that this engagement has taken place in line with their strategic interests, these countries in some areas prefer the so-called “deliberate overlooking.”
The fundamental concern of Moscow and Beijing relates to the expansion of U.S. influence in the region and the possibility of its return to Afghanistan, especially in the form of military bases. In this same framework, even during the period of the Afghan Republic, efforts were made through engagement with the Taliban to create conditions for the formation of a participatory government and ultimately facilitate the withdrawal of NATO forces.
For Russia and China, it is clear that under current conditions the extensive presence of diverse terrorist groups in Afghanistan—from Ansarullah, Uyghurs, Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, and Caucasians to the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), Jaish al-Adl, Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP), and other groups—constitutes a direct threat to regional security.
Russia’s and China’s strategy in response to this situation is a combination of gaining informational advantage through diplomatic and economic engagement, as well as trying to gain influence among different Taliban factions, so that in the long term they can manage this group’s internal equations. Otherwise, if the regional countries neglect this, a new wave of terrorist attacks aimed at destabilizing Central Asia may occur, which could simultaneously target Russia's security and China's economic interests. The activation of the process of building religious schools (madrasahs) in the Tajik, Uzbek and Hazara regions of Afghanistan will not be unrelated to this issue.

• IESS: What possible consequences could these tensions have for Iran? And what role could Iran play in reducing or controlling them?

Answer: Recent developments indicate that the danger of the spillover of insecurity and terrorist actions to the borders of Iran and Afghanistan cannot be dismissed. Reports published in Iranian media suggest that during recent internal unrest in that country, certain elements affiliated with extremist and terrorist groups entered it, and some of them are still at large; an issue that could create grounds for future security threats.
Within this framework, the Islamic Republic of Iran (in addition to domestic preventive measures) can adopt an active regional approach to help create or strengthen mechanisms of collective security cooperation. In this regard, expanding intelligence sharing, operational coordination, and conducting joint counterterrorism operations—especially within the framework of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), as well as through bilateral initiatives—can play an important role in containing and preventing the spread of these threats.