Institute for East Strategic Studies 18 Jun 2026 - 10:46 https://www.iess.ir/en/analysis/4306/ -------------------------------------------------- The American S7+ Plan Title : The American S7+ Plan and Its Geopolitical Implications for Iran -------------------------------------------------- The Silk Seven Plus (S7+) initiative should be regarded as the latest version of the policy of “regionalization through connectivity” across the space linking Central Asia, Afghanistan, and South Asia; an initiative that is ostensibly articulated through the language of trade, investment, transportation, energy, and institutional development, but at a deeper level represents an effort to reconfigure the geopolitics of Eurasia. In its official introduction, S7+ is defined as a U.S.-aligned framework for economic integration and strategic balancing, intended to connect the five Central Asian countries, together with Afghanistan and Pakistan, within a common economic framework, while also allowing for the future accession of additional countries. Text : By: Behrouz Ghezel 13 Minutes Reading    Introduction The Silk Seven Plus (S7+) initiative should be regarded as the latest version of the policy of “regionalization through connectivity” across the space linking Central Asia, Afghanistan, and South Asia; an initiative that is ostensibly articulated through the language of trade, investment, transportation, energy, and institutional development, but at a deeper level represents an effort to reconfigure the geopolitics of Eurasia. In its official introduction, S7+ is defined as a U.S.-aligned framework for economic integration and strategic balancing, intended to connect the five Central Asian countries, together with Afghanistan and Pakistan, within a common economic framework, while also allowing for the future accession of additional countries.   What Exactly Is S7+? S7+, unveiled in April 2026 by the American think tank New Lines at the United States Congress, is not merely a transit initiative or a limited development concept. Rather, it is a project that continues earlier discourses such as Greater Central Asia, the New Silk Road, and the Heart of Asia. These discourses were all based on the assumption that landlocked Central Asia should be connected to South Asia and open waters through Afghanistan and Pakistan in order to overcome its geopolitical isolation. However, academic literature and the experience of recent decades indicate that this type of “connectivity-based regionalism” has consistently fluctuated between aspiration and reality. Even where certain infrastructures have been available, factors such as production patterns, border disruptions, weak governance, interstate tensions, and great-power competition have affected the actual relationship between “connectivity” and “integration.” The introductory document of S7+ presents it as an initiative for a new generation of regional economic partnership, aimed at laying the foundations for a more integrated and competitive regional economy through a common framework for trade, investment, and economic cooperation. Yet the principal significance of the initiative lies in its explicit and implicit objectives. In its official introduction, at least six key “outcomes” are identified for S7+: -Large-scale critical minerals -Reduction of dependence on China -Energy security through TAPI -Utilization of Gwadar as a maritime gateway -Reduction of Iran’s transit leverage -Strengthening digital and institutional capacity, particularly in Pakistan This list demonstrates that S7+ simultaneously pursues three layers: Physical connectivity: corridors, ports, pipelines, and logistics networks; Institutional connectivity: standards, customs procedures, transit regulations, and multilateral arrangements; Geopolitical connectivity: changing the balance of influence among the United States, China, Russia, and regional actors.  dfAccordingly, this initiative is not merely about “building roads”; it is about constructing rules and an “architecture of power.”  In its official presentation, it is even claimed that the United States is the only credible coordinator of this framework because it has no territorial claims and is not in direct conflict with any of the parties, while simultaneously possessing access to financial markets and has the power to set standards.  These assertions—regardless of whether they are accurate or not—reveal the geopolitical nature of the initiative.   The Position of S7+ in the U.S.–China–Russia Competition Understanding S7+ is impossible without understanding the trilateral competition among the United States, China, and Russia in Central Asia. Since the 1990s, Russia has sought to preserve Central Asia as part of its historical, security, and economic sphere of influence. This objective has been pursued through control over energy routes, security arrangements, linguistic and institutional ties, and later through initiatives such as the Eurasian Economic Union. In contrast, China has entered the region through a more functional and flexible form of regionalism. Particularly through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), and investments in infrastructure, pipelines, and trade networks, China have deepened its influence. At the same time, competition between China and Russia in Central Asia has not necessarily resulted in one displacing the other, and even in many cases, a form of limited and pragmatic convergence has emerged between them, particularly in opposition to U.S. dominance and in their preference for shaping a regional order independent of the West. Nevertheless, China generally understands this regionalism as network-based, open, and functional, whereas Russia tends to view it in spatial, legal, and somewhat protective terms. Against this backdrop, S7+ represents an American effort to re-enter a regional game at a moment when—according to the initiative’s own introductory document—the regional architecture is taking shape without Washington and the window of opportunity is open but closing. Consequently, S7+ is less an economic project than a policy or program designed to “prevent the exclusion of the United States from an emerging regional order.”   The Operational Dimensions of S7+: Afghanistan, Gwadar, Minerals, and TAPI 1) Afghanistan as an “Economic Node” The official presentation of S7+ states that the initiative’s operational approach views Afghanistan not as a “security problem” but as an “economic node,” prioritizing customs, transit, minerals, and energy. This shift in language is significant. Within this framework, Afghanistan is transformed from an issue of “crisis management” into a subject of “extracting geo-economic value.” Yet this is also where the initiative’s greatest ambiguity lies. The literature on connectivity processes in the Heart of Asia indicates that Afghanistan has always been a decisive yet fragile link (Without relative stability and effective institutions, regional connectivity can easily devolve into insecure and costly corridors). Therefore, in practice, S7+ betting on the assumption that “Afghanistan’s transit and mineral potential can be utilized without fully resolving its security and governance challenges”—an assumption that remains highly controversial. 2) Critical Minerals The initiative’s introductory document refers to more than one trillion dollars in Afghanistan’s mineral wealth and more than 20 million tons of rare earth elements in Kazakhstan, describing these reserves as “assets” that the United States cannot afford to ignore. Given the political economy of the energy transition, technological competition, and supply chains for Lithium, copper, rare earth elements, and uranium, the importance of these resources for Washington have moved beyond the status of ordinary commodities and become foundations of geopolitical power. In this sense, S7+ is not merely a transportation corridor but also a significant component of a supply chain. If China has spent the past two decades seeking access to Central Asia’s raw materials and export routes through investment, loans, and infrastructure, this initiative seeks to design a pathway for extracting and exporting these resources under “open” and non-exclusive conditions. S7+ should therefore be understood as part of the broader competition over critical minerals. 3) Energy and the TAPI Project In the presentation of S7+, the TAPI pipeline (Turkmenistan–Afghanistan–Pakistan–India), with a potential capacity of 33 billion cubic meters of gas per year, is highlighted as a project that has now entered the construction phase after 30 years of delay. This emphasis is not accidental. Energy infrastructure in Central Asia has always been an arena of both cooperation and competition—serving simultaneously as a tool for connectivity and revenue generation, and as a mechanism for creating interdependence and geopolitical influence. For the United States, emphasizing TAPI means strengthening an energy axis that is neither dependent on Russia nor routed through Iran. For Pakistan and Afghanistan, the pipeline can be viewed both as a source of transit revenue and as an instrument for consolidating their role within the regional architecture. Nevertheless, the historical experience of the project indicates that the gap between its “political launch” and its “economic realization” remains considerable. 4) Gwadar and Port Competition Within the S7+ vision, Gwadar is presented as the closest warm-water port to Central Asia and Afghanistan and is regarded as a maritime gateway providing access to the Persian Gulf, the Arabian Sea, East Africa, Southeast Asia, and India. This vision even speaks of a targeted capacity of 400 million tons by 2045. From Iran’s perspective, this assertion is highly noteworthy because, within this framework, Gwadar is not merely a Pakistani port but a competing port within a new connectivity architecture. At the same time, research on the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) indicates that Pakistan and China have long portrayed Gwadar as a gateway for connecting with Central Asia. As a result, S7+ is, to some extent, attempting to utilize the previous geopolitical imaginations and infrastructures—albeit in a form different from CPEC—and integrate it into a framework aligned with U.S. interests. This outlook—making use of a route that previously stood at the center of a Chinese initiative, with the aim of reducing dependence on China—is itself one of the most striking contradictions of the project!   The Implications of S7+ for Iran: Threats and Opportunities 1) A Direct Threat to Iran’s Transit Advantage The most important point for Iran is that the official presentation of the initiative explicitly mentions the “Iran Bypass” and explains that the Southern Corridor and the Middle Corridor should “systematically” reduce Iran’s transit leverage. Unlike many American regional initiatives whose anti-Iranian consequences are indirect, this initiative presents the reduction of Iran’s role as part of its strategic design rather than merely a side effect. For Iran, this represents a threat to one of its principal geo-economic advantages—its position as the shortest and most natural route connecting Central Asia to the Persian Gulf, the Gulf of Oman, and the markets of West Asia. If the Afghanistan–Pakistan–Gwadar route, or a combination of it with the Middle Corridor (and the potential inclusion of Azerbaijan), becomes more operationally viable for a portion of regional trade and energy flows, Iran will no longer be the “indispensable route” but merely “one of the available options.” This shift alone could significantly reduce its bargaining power. 2) Intensified Corridor Competition with Chabahar and INSTC  In recent years, Iran has invested substantial political capital in Chabahar, The International North–South Transport Corridor (INSTC), and transportation links with Central Asia and Afghanistan. Although S7+ does not necessarily eliminate these routes, it may redirect the attention of investors, regional partners, and even some potential transit customers toward competing corridors. This comes at a time when infrastructure investment in this field is limited and the decisions of economic actors are shaped by costs, risk tolerance, and predictability. Consequently, every alternative route naturally erodes part of Iran’s comparative advantage. 3) Reduced Iranian Leverage in a Sanctions Environment For a sanctioned Iran, transit is not merely a source of revenue; it is also an instrument of foreign policy. The less dependent regional countries are on Iran for trade, energy, and maritime access, the less capable Tehran becomes of converting geography into a tool of influence. Therefore, even if S7+ is never fully realized, the very creation of a “credible perception of an alternative route” can generate tangible strategic effects. 4) Pressure on Eastern Iran If Afghanistan is transformed into a mineral-transit hub within the framework of S7+ and Pakistan becomes the logistical and digital pillar of the initiative, eastern Iran will face a new spatial reconfiguration. This transformation could lead to the relative marginalization of certain Iranian routes unless Iran succeeds in actively integrating its eastern provinces into emerging trade, energy, and service chains.   Is S7+ Necessarily (and Solely) a Threat? The answer to this question is no. As the academic literature on regionalism in Central Asia demonstrates, the region is neither fully integrated nor are its connectivity potentials easily realized. Therefore, S7+ is less an “established order” than a “competing project.” This very characteristic creates several opportunities for Iran. First, if Tehran moves beyond a purely defensive approach, it can capitalize on the reality that many Central Asian states seek diversification of partners and routes rather than exclusive dependence. In such an environment, Iran can still remain an important option, provided that it makes its routes more competitive in terms of cost, time, and reliability. Second, S7+ may serve as a catalyst for Iran to move beyond the traditional notion of “natural geographic advantage.” In today’s world, geography creates advantages only when accompanied by efficient infrastructure, streamlined customs procedures, financing mechanisms, insurance services, regulatory stability, and active diplomacy. If Iran improves these variables, it can preserve or even reconstruct a substantial portion of its advantages despite the emergence of new competitors. Third, there is the complexity of U.S., Chinese, and Russian relations in Central Asia. This means that no initiative in the region is capable of eliminating all others on its own, and new infrastructures are generally built upon existing networks rather than completely replacing them. Accordingly, there remains room for a form of competitive coexistence among regional corridors.   Conclusion The S7+ initiative should be viewed as a new version of the long-standing idea of connecting Central Asia to South Asia, but with one important difference. This time, “connectivity” is explicitly being employed in the service of geopolitical competition, supply-chain security, access to critical minerals, balancing against China and Russia, and “bypassing Iran.” The official presentation of the initiative refers to Afghanistan as an economic node, Gwadar as a maritime gateway, TAPI as an energy pillar, and the “reduction of Iran’s transit leverage” as one of the initiative’s objectives. For Iran, this initiative represents both a threat and a warning. It is a threat because it explicitly seeks to reduce Iran’s transit role, and it is a warning because it demonstrates that the era of relying solely on the “natural advantage of geography” has come to an end. At the same time, S7+ is not yet a consolidated project. The fragility of Afghanistan and its military-security tensions with Pakistan, the rivalries among South Asian actors, Russia’s deeply rooted influence, China’s extensive economic presence, and the region’s institutional and infrastructural challenges all cast uncertainty over the full realization of the initiative. Within such a landscape, the principal issue for Iran is not verbal opposition to the initiative but its active management. Such management can be achieved in a “post-war environment” through enhancing the competitiveness of Iranian routes, redefining the role of Chabahar and the country’s eastern regions, deepening relations with Central Asia, and transforming Iran from a reactive actor into a designing actor within the emerging corridor order.   Behrouz Ghezel is a Researcher at the Institute for East Strategic Studies.