Introduction

In the new geopolitical environment, the concept of a “strategic partnership” is no longer confined to geographical proximity or cultural commonalities; rather, it is contingent upon the degree of overlap in threats, convergence in security perceptions, and the capacity to shape regional order. Within this framework, relations between the Islamic Republic of Iran and Pakistan, as two Muslim countries possessing significant military, demographic, and geopolitical capacities, have acquired heightened importance in regional security equations. Nevertheless, despite the existence of tangible and operational grounds for deeper cooperation, Pakistan’s approach to a strategic partnership with Iran has remained conservative, cautious, and at times instrumental. This condition stems less from a lack of shared interests than from the perceptual framework governing Islamabad’s foreign policy. Since the end of the Cold War, Pakistan has based its foreign policy on a strategy of “external balancing,” seeking to maintain a fragile equilibrium among competing regional and extra-regional actors—particularly the United States, Saudi Arabia, China, and Iran. While this approach has reduced the costs of confrontation in the short term, in the long run it has eroded Pakistan’s strategic autonomy and increased its dependence on externally imposed security equations. Under such circumstances, understanding the nature of Pakistan’s perception of a strategic partnership with the Islamic Republic of Iran, as well as the necessity of redefining Pakistan–Iran relations, becomes imperative. This redefinition is not an ideological choice, but rather a necessity arising from Pakistan’s national interests.

The Iran–Pakistan Axis as an Initiator of “Islamic Security Institution-Building”

According to the literature on “regional security convergence,” most effective collective security institutions have not emerged from broad initial consensus, but rather from cooperation among a limited number of key actors with overlapping interests (Acharya, 2014: 67). The experiences of NATO, The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and even the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) demonstrate that the initial core of such institutions has typically formed among countries that simultaneously faced shared threats and possessed the necessary institutional capacity and political will. Within this context, the “Iran–Pakistan axis,” for the following reasons, theoretically meets the conditions required to serve as the “initial core” of an Islamic security initiative. 
First, Iran and Pakistan are exposed to shared threats that directly affect the national security of both states, including instability in Afghanistan, transnational extremism, border insecurity in Balochistan, regional terrorism, and interventions by extra-regional actors. Contrary to the prevailing perception in Islamabad, these threats are exacerbated not by cooperation with Iran, but by the absence of an independent regional security framework (Tellis, 2021: 104). Structured cooperation with Iran could reduce Pakistan’s security costs and enhance its control over its surrounding environment.
Second, Pakistan, as the only Muslim country possessing nuclear weapons, enjoys considerable symbolic capital and strategic deterrence; however, this capacity has largely been defined within the context of competition with India and has been less utilized to enhance Pakistan’s regional standing in the Muslim world. Active participation in a security partnership with Iran could transform this capacity from a purely bilateral instrument into a lever of multilateral Islamic influence (Kapur, 2022: 58).
Third, Pakistan’s traditional dependence on financial assistance from Arab countries and security support from the United States, while generating short-term economic benefits, has in the long term constrained Islamabad’s decision-making and strategic autonomy. Security studies indicate that countries lacking diversity in their strategic partners are more vulnerable to political and security pressure than others (Walt, 2009: 92). From this perspective, deepening a strategic partnership with Iran could help diversify Pakistan’s strategic portfolio and reduce its vulnerability to external pressures. 
However, the realization of such an axis requires a paradigm shift in the outlook of Pakistan’s security elites. The Islamic Republic of Iran should not be viewed merely as a variable in relations with Saudi Arabia or the United States, but rather as a potential partner whose cooperation could enhance Pakistan’s border security, internal stability, and international bargaining power. This change in perception is not an ideological move, but a decision grounded in calculations of national interest.

The Role of the Iran–Pakistan Partnership in Confronting Israel and the United States

One of the most significant failures of the political order of the Muslim world has been its inability to respond in a practical and coordinated manner to Israel’s repeated aggressions against Islamic countries. Deterrence theory indicates that the absence of a collective response itself encourages aggressive behavior (Jervis, 1978: 174). Under such conditions, the creation of even a limited security framework can yield substantial deterrent effects. A strategic partnership between Iran and Pakistan, even without immediately evolving into a formal institution, could offer a practical model of Islamic security cooperation. Political coordination, the exchange of strategic intelligence, and diplomatic alignment within international institutions could increase the costs of Israeli military actions and further isolate Israel at both regional and international levels (Mearsheimer & Walt, 2007: 302). Therefore, for Pakistan, participation in such a process—contrary to prevailing assumptions—does not necessarily imply direct military confrontation, but rather entails an increase in Islamabad’s political and moral weight in the Muslim world. Passive neutrality toward the Palestinian crisis and falling into the trap of American–Israeli peace frameworks would not only weaken Pakistan’s standing, but would also prevent the country from capitalizing on its symbolic capacity as a key actor in the Muslim world (Fair, 2018: 141). 
On the other hand, strengthening regional cooperation among Muslim countries could reduce dependence on the United States for security. Over the past four decades, the United States has demonstrated that it defines Middle Eastern security not on the basis of sustainable stability, but on the management of crises and the preservation of Israel’s superiority (Gerges, 2023: 211). The formation of even a limited Islamic security axis could challenge this equation and expand the maneuvering space of regional states. For Pakistan, this would translate into reduced political pressure from the United States, greater decision-making autonomy, and enhanced bargaining power in bilateral relations with Washington. The experience of countries such as Turkey shows that diversification of regional alliances not only does not lead to international isolation, but actually increases diplomatic maneuverability (Aydin, 2020: 89).

Conclusion and Recommendations

An analysis of Pakistan’s perception of a strategic partnership with the Islamic Republic of Iran indicates that the primary obstacle to deepening this relationship is not the absence of shared interests, but rather the conservative and short-term perceptual framework of Islamabad’s foreign policy. At a time when the regional security environment is becoming increasingly unstable and multipolar, the continuation of a policy of passive balancing has exposed Pakistan to growing external pressures rather than ensuring its security. Iran, despite structural limitations in leading an “Islamic NATO,” remains one of the few regional actors possessing both the material capacity and the political will to challenge the imposed security order. For Pakistan, ignoring this reality would mean forfeiting the opportunity to participate in shaping the future regional order. A strategic partnership with Iran is not a substitute for Pakistan’s relations with other actors, but rather a necessary complement for enhancing its strategic autonomy.
Strategic Recommendations
• Redefining the position of the Islamic Republic of Iran in Pakistan’s national security documents as a potential strategic partner, rather than merely a balancing variable.
• Institutionalizing bilateral border security and intelligence cooperation as an initial confidence-building measure.
• Gradual diplomatic alignment between the two sides on the Palestinian issue and in opposition to the aggressions of the Zionist regime, in order to increase the political weight of the Muslim world.
• Reducing Pakistan’s one-dimensional dependence on U.S. security guarantees through diversification of regional partnerships.
• Long-term investment in strategic diplomacy with the Islamic Republic of Iran in the fields of energy, security, and transit. 
Ultimately, transforming Pakistan’s passive outlook toward a “strategic partnership” with the Islamic Republic of Iran and actively engaging in such a partnership is not an ideological act, but a rational decision based on cost–benefit analysis and aligned with Islamabad’s long-term national interests—a decision that could elevate Pakistan from a “reactive actor” to an “effective actor” within the security order of the Muslim world.