https://www.iess.ir/ Sat, 27 Apr 2024 13:33:10 GMT /skins/default/en/normal/ch01_newsfeed_logo.gif https://www.iess.ir/ 100 70 en Copyright (c) Institute for East Strategic Studies, all rights reserved. Sat, 27 Apr 2024 13:33:10 GMT 60 https://www.iess.ir/en/analysis/3717/ After more than two years of Taliban rule, the conflicting positions of the international community and the Taliban have made the recognition of the Taliban government still pending. But this does not mean that there are no relations between the Taliban government and other countries. During this period, by establishing close economic relations with some countries, the Taliban has been able to bypass non-recognition and get out of isolation to some extent. Adopting an economy-oriented foreign policy, planning for the economic visits of Taliban officials, encouraging foreign investors to be present in Afghanistan, signing large economic contracts with foreign parties, and paying attention to regional transit have been among the most important measures of the Taliban government in the economic sector. ]]> Afghanistan Tue, 23 Apr 2024 10:02:57 GMT https://www.iess.ir/en/analysis/3717/ https://www.iess.ir/en/analysis/3696/ After the fall of the republic government and the Taliban’s regaining power in Afghanistan, this movement was not prepared to rule Afghanistan in terms of politics and governance. Also, from a military point of view, the Taliban fighters did not have the experience of creating and managing national institutions, such as the army and the police. It was for this reason that at the beginning, the stability and permanence of the Taliban rule in post-2021 Afghanistan seemed to be unstable and uncertain, and some experts believed in a short-term survival of the Taliban government. But contrary to expectations, Taliban rule was established in a good momentum and was stabilized to some extent. In this article, "establishing factors" and " durability factors" of the Taliban rule in Afghanistan are reviewed. ]]> Afghanistan Sat, 16 Mar 2024 06:26:08 GMT https://www.iess.ir/en/analysis/3696/ https://www.iess.ir/en/analysis/3688/ By holding the elections on 8 February 2024, Pakistan will know its rulers for the next five years. Everyone who takes office, more than anything, seeks to save Pakistan from the economic crisis, confront the growth of extremism, redefine relations with neighbors, decide on the existing challenges with two neighbors (India and Afghanistan), and define and restore Pakistan's position in the regional and international arenas and among the players in this arena. ]]> Pakistan Sat, 02 Mar 2024 09:03:23 GMT https://www.iess.ir/en/analysis/3688/ https://www.iess.ir/en/roundtable/3686/ IESS's specialized meeting on "Central Asia's view of interaction with Iran; Tehran's Opportunities and Challenges" was held with the presence of Iranian and non-Iranian experts. ]]> Central Asia Tue, 27 Feb 2024 09:47:32 GMT https://www.iess.ir/en/roundtable/3686/ https://www.iess.ir/en/analysis/3672/ Afghanistan's security-oriented approach, which was at its peak during Hamid Karzai rule, was officially abandoned when Ashraf Ghani took office, and it was replaced by an economic-oriented foreign policy. One of the important features of such an approach was the reduction of economic interactions with South Asia, especially Pakistan, as a crisis-generating region, and the increase of economic interactions with Central Asia as a calm and somewhat non-security region. The goal of this approach was that Afghanistan would reduce its vulnerability from Pakistan in terms of security, by reducing the level of economic relations with this country. After the Taliban coming back to power in Afghanistan in August 2021, they have based their foreign policy on an economy-oriented approach, with the aim of moving away from Pakistan and getting closer to Central Asia. ]]> Afghanistan Sat, 10 Feb 2024 06:16:55 GMT https://www.iess.ir/en/analysis/3672/ https://www.iess.ir/en/analysis/3656/ The fact is that before this, Russia and in some limited cases, China, were the main suppliers of weapons and defense equipment to Central Asian countries. Other suppliers, if any, were present in non-strategic areas. Now it seems that the balance of these areas is on the verge of change, with the acting of Turkey and Iran in the drone area, the arrival of new warships in the Caspian Sea, or the recent proposals of France to sell Rafale fighters or Master Grand 400 air defense radar. ]]> Central Asia Wed, 17 Jan 2024 09:04:47 GMT https://www.iess.ir/en/analysis/3656/ https://www.iess.ir/en/analysis/3647/ The UN Secretary-General has tried to stop the bloody cycle of competition in Afghanistan, both internally (by creating conditions for interaction between the Taliban and the opposition) and externally (by reducing international and regional rivalries), in order to create political stability in the country. This is why the UN Secretary General is seeking to reach a lasting and sustainable regional solution toward peace, through the expansion of the Taliban’s current monopoly of power. In this regard, Guterres has tried to encourage the Taliban to accept an inclusive government with ethnic and religious diversity, so that a favorable ground for the participation of all political currents will gradually be prepared. The importance of this issue will become more clear when the dual nature of the Taliban Emirate structure is taken into consideration. ]]> Afghanistan Sat, 13 Jan 2024 05:25:06 GMT https://www.iess.ir/en/analysis/3647/ https://www.iess.ir/en/roundtable/3632/ Institute for East Strategic Studies in collaboration with the International Studies Institute of Moscow State University of International Relations (MGIMO) held a webinar under the title "Foreign actors’ policy towards the Taliban government; Analysis and perspectives." ]]> Afghanistan Thu, 14 Dec 2023 03:24:43 GMT https://www.iess.ir/en/roundtable/3632/ https://www.iess.ir/en/analysis/3612/ Central Asia is currently seeking to maximize its military and defense power, by using non-Russian capabilities. Meanwhile, many foreign players such as Turkey, India, Pakistan and some western countries have taken effective measures to take advantage of these conditions. By using these supports, the countries of the region have developed their defense and military infrastructure internally and in their intra-regional approaches. ]]> Central Asia Thu, 30 Nov 2023 03:56:21 GMT https://www.iess.ir/en/analysis/3612/ https://www.iess.ir/en/interview/3599/ In the last 20 years, Arab countries had three different positions towards Afghanistan. First, a group of countries which had a completely neutral position and were uninterested in Afghanistan's issues. This group included the countries of the Fertile Crescent and the Persian Gulf states, except Qatar. Second, Iraq which had the same fate as Afghanistan, and monitored the situation in Afghanistan, but had no interaction with Kabul. Third, a number of Arab countries such as Egypt, the UAE and Saudi Arabia which tried to engage the Afghanistan's issues, within the macro frameworks of their strategic interactions with the West. Due to the power transfer in some of these countries, including Saudi Arabia, Riyadh withdrew from an important acting role in the second ring of the Afghan crisis to the third ring. In this regard, neither the Afghan government nor the Taliban did consider Saudis’ commitment and interest in Afghanistan seriously. ]]> Afghanistan Tue, 07 Nov 2023 04:06:02 GMT https://www.iess.ir/en/interview/3599/