Introduction
The diversification of transit access for Central Asia is considered a matter of national security—essentially a component of survival strategies for landlocked states. This necessity elevates the diversification of transit routes into a vital element in foreign and domestic policy discourses, as well as in economic development programs. Reactions to these issues are therefore often swift, serious, and strategically driven.
From this perspective, Central Asia’s response to the aggression of the Zionist regime and the United States against Iran can be analyzed within the framework of transit discourses, since Iran is one of the key access routes for the region. Over the past month, different discourses have emerged in Central Asia on this issue, which can be studied from various dimensions. These discourses may also lead to the emergence or strengthening of certain foreign policy outcomes in these countries. At the same time, reflecting on and understanding these discourses plays a significant role in shaping the future of Iran–Central Asia relations.

Iran’s Transit Position for Central Asia
Understanding the importance of Central Asia’s transit discourses after the aggression of the Zionist regime and the United States against Iran requires an evaluation of Iran’s transit position in relation to the region. Central Asia is a landlocked area, and to reach open waters it must pass through one or two countries and cover a distance of more than a thousand kilometers. Consequently, transportation costs for these countries are approximately 30% higher, resulting in reduced competitive advantage, intensified dependency, and constraints in trade.
In general, Central Asia could have five sea access routes through China, Russia, the Caspian Sea and the South Caucasus, Afghanistan, and Iran. Among these, Afghanistan has been unusable due to security issues, and China due to lack of economic feasibility. 
Access to the Black Sea, either by crossing or circumventing the Caspian Sea and passing through two South Caucasus countries, has so far been uneconomical and severely capacity-constrained. Currently, the capacity of the Middle Corridor is only 4 million tons, insufficient even for one Central Asian country. Moreover, the projected 10-million-ton capacity of the Middle Corridor for the next decade, apart from political discourse, offers little real attraction. For example, in the first nine months of 2023, Kazakhstan alone used 2 million tons of this route, compared to the country's 29 million tons of total transit in the same period—meaning the Middle Corridor accounted for just 6.8% (excluding oil and gas), a marginal share. The figure for other Central Asian countries and China is even smaller.
So far, Russia has been the main transit corridor for Central Asia, attractive due to its solid infrastructure and low overall costs. However, the imposition of severe Western sanctions on Russia, and Central Asia’s concerns about accusations of sanction evasion have weakened this route. Still, reports show that in 2024 Kazakhstan alone used 110 million tons of transit via Russia, of which 88% (around 96 million tons) was oil, and roughly 14 million tons was other goods. This figure alone exceeds the entire future projection of the Middle Corridor.
Russian officials have also stated that in 2023 the country’s total transit volume was 1.2 billion tons, about 70% of which was transported by rail. In addition to Russian goods, China and Central Asia were the two main users of Russia’s transit infrastructure. This demonstrates that despite sanctions, Russia remains an important transit option for Central Asia.
Iran represents another route which, while not competitive with Russia, is far more attractive compared to Afghanistan and the South Caucasus. Iran offers the shortest access for Central Asia to open ocean waters, making it potentially the fastest and cheapest route.
According to Iran’s Customs report, in 2023 transit through Iran grew by about 20%, reaching 22 million tons. The greatest growth occurred in border customs such as Lotfabad and Sarakhs, which handle exchanges with Central Asia. Iranian officials also reported that the operational capacity of Sarakhs and Incheboron rail corridors is currently 6–7 million tons annually, but with agreements signed with Turkmenistan, this can rise to 16 million tons within three years, and later to 20 million tons. Thus, Iran represents one of the most important transit access routes for Central Asia, with high growth potential, especially within the framework of the region’s new trade routes.

Transit Discourse of Central Asia
After the aggression of the Zionist regime and the United States against Iran, most approaches in Central Asia framed the conflict as a battle against the China–Russia–Iran alliance. In a realist view, these countries acknowledged that they lack the capacity to influence the situation, but argued that through supplementary measures, they could reduce their costs during the tensions.
The Central Asian perspective was that small states have no chance of influencing battles between international and regional powers; therefore, their task is to wait and then congratulate the winner. Within this discursive environment, the most important concern in Central Asia (after security issues) is international transit and corridors, while a portion of Central Asia’s transit outlook has held positive expectations toward Iran for the future. 
Immediately after the start of the military aggression against Iran, Uzbekistan’s government held an extraordinary meeting and decided to redirect its transit cargo toward safer ports and logistics centers. At the same time, Uzbekistan’s Deputy Minister of Transport stated that tensions in the Middle East could negatively impact logistics in both Central Asia and the world.
Meanwhile, Kazakhstan’s Minister of Economy told the country’s Senate that with growing insecurity along Iran’s rail corridor, Kazakhstan is prepared to strengthen alternative routes. He emphasized that shifting to multimodal routes would not greatly affect prices, as prices will be determined in global markets. Nevertheless, Kazakh media reported that this issue directly impacts the recent Iran–Kazakhstan agreement on the transit of around 3 million tons of grain. In Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, Iran's transit situation was also examined with a similar approach, mainly in the media.
One of the first international and official venues where these discourses emerged was the ECO Summit hosted in Khankendi, Azerbaijan. Within this framework, Shavkat Mirziyoyev, the President of Uzbekistan, emphasized that given the current geopolitical situation, attention to alternative transit routes is essential. Other Central Asian and even South Caucasus officials also used this platform to stress the importance of new transit corridors such as the Trans-Afghan and Trans-Caspian routes— which was implicitly and sometimes directly in response to Iran’s new circumstances.
Although such ideas would have been raised even regardless of Iran’s position in its war with the Israeli regime, in the new context, attaching these proposals to Iran’s security situation has imparted a greater sense of pragmatism. In Kazakhstan, in the post-war period, the Prime Minister announced that Astana is interested in investing in the Torghundi–Herat corridor as well as in a logistics center in Herat. Afghan sources have put the volume of this investment at around 500 million USD. Russian officials have also expressed views aligned with this approach. Alexei Overchuk, Deputy Prime Minister of Russia, spoke about the eastern and western routes within the North–South Corridor, with the eastern route being based on Afghanistan. Russia’s recognition of the Taliban government in this period can also be seen as supportive of this orientation.
In the media and expert discussions, several other discursive axes took shape. The main alternative idea in response to Iran’s situation has been linking Central Asian transit projects to non-Iranian routes. For example, in the media and political discourses of Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, connecting the China–Kyrgyzstan–Uzbekistan railway project to the Trans-Caspian or Trans-Afghan corridors instead of through Iran has been discussed. Another emerging discourse has focused on infrastructure problems inside Iran. Narratives have highlighted that Iranian ports generally face infrastructural challenges that increase the costs and time of transport and have already diminished their attractiveness.
It has also been claimed that the volume of transit through Iran was already limited, and the added insecurity and uncertainty about Iran’s future security environment will not have a significant impact on Central Asian logistics. Some discourses further emphasized the likelihood of increased Iranian restrictions at border terminals due to counterintelligence and security measures against Israel regime, which would negatively affect transport flows through Iran in the future.
Meanwhile, given the constant threats from Trump and the Israeli regime against Iran, discourses have also emerged about the necessity of revising Central Asian logistical policies. Some Russian sources have reinforced this view, arguing that insecurity in the Iranian route would redirect attention back to Russia despite sanctions—providing Moscow with greater bargaining leverage vis-à-vis Europe on sanctions issues.
In addition, certain expert-oriented perspectives have formed. A notable example is that some American military analysts have framed one of the objectives or consequences of an assault on Iran as the disruption of Iran’s “Look East Policy.” These analysts argue that military damage, particularly to Iran’s infrastructure, could prevent Iran from becoming a key node in Central Asia’s supply chain and transit hub. Even if Central Asia itself suffers from this disruption, the United States, they suggest, is willing to pursue this strategy. This line of thinking has had both direct and indirect echoes in Central Asia.

Possible Implications
First and foremost, it must be acknowledged that Central Asia’s concerns over transit are to some extent real and natural, and thus deserve attention and clear responses over time. However, another part of this reality is the “exaggeration” of the issue, largely driven by Western discourse-shaping. Much of these narratives have been advanced in semi-expert circles close to the West, characterized by ambiguous and highly skeptical statements —indicating a kind of organized discursive policy.
Given the positions of Central Asian officials and other actors, these discourses appear influential. In practice, none of Iran’s logistical infrastructure (apart from the aviation sector) sustained serious damage during the assaults, and except for a specific 12-day period, transit flows were not meaningfully disrupted. Even Western realist assessments have acknowledged this situation. Nevertheless, such exaggerations have only been voiced in Central Asia.
It should also be noted that certain secondary players such as the Taliban, Azerbaijan, and Turkey have sought to maximize their positions and interests in the emerging situation. The Azerbaijani Prime Minister, for instance, spoke of defining the Lazurite Corridor which connects Afghanistan through Turkmenistan to the South Caucasus— A project that, like the previous Lapis Lazuli Corridor, aims to bypass Iran to connect Afghanistan to Europe. Taliban officials, too, in their dealings with Central Asian counterparts, have especially sought to present Afghanistan as a serious alternative to Iran.
Finally, one must recognize that this war, along with the ongoing threats from the Israeli regime and the U.S. as well as the Iranian own domestic media and expert discourses that predict the continuation of the conflict, has created an atmosphere of ambiguity and uncertainty around investment in Iran’s logistical infrastructure. This situation—through heightened risk and diminished attractiveness of investment in Iran infrastructures—directly affects the outlook for Iran’s role in Central Asia’s strategic transit policies.

Conclusion: Future Imperatives
The reality is that Iran currently lacks the capacity to shape discourse at the political and media levels in Central Asia. Thus, advancing Iranian interests in this domain—at least in the short term—appears unlikely. However, two avenues remain:
Capacity-building for the future in this sphere as a strategic necessity for Iran’s interests.
Facilitating and accelerating “real” and “functional” processes in transit area, such that the contradictions in the prevailing discourses are soon revealed.
In this regard, Iran must provide pragmatic and realistic responses to Central Asia’s transit-related risks. A particularly effective measure would be for Iranian ambassadors in the region, as well as Central Asian ambassadors in Iran, to engage in special activities in this framework. Organizing tours of Iranian ports and logistics centers for regional ambassadors in Iran, and convening specialized political and media meetings on transit led by Iranian embassies in the region, is crucial. The key responsibility of Iranian ambassadors is to provide security guarantees and precise expert reports to Central Asian governments. Offering alternative insurance services and similar measures would also be highly impactful.
At the same time, Iran will inevitably need to design new media and expert events on transit, based on the new conditions. The fact is that without a “strong and visible field presence” based on an “optimistic” but “reality-based” approach, Iran cannot counter the current situation or prevent its heavy future costs. 
Furthermore, Iran should, as quickly as possible, launch official transit initiatives within the framework of international organizations (such as the recent ECO transport ministers’ meeting hosted by Iran) or through multilateral Iran–Central Asia approaches. For example, initiatives such as holding a meeting of deputy transport ministers in Chabahar, or a meeting of national railway heads of Central Asian countries in Bandar Abbas should be planned as soon as possible in any political mechanism or regional organization. The more transit and logistics issues of Iran are placed on the Central Asian agenda, the weaker the anti-Iranian discourses will become.
Three further points also deserve attention:
Media efforts should strengthen realistic discourses regarding Afghanistan’s security situation and its uncertain infrastructure investment prospects. Such narratives must emphasize Afghanistan’s “relative security” and the necessity of connecting northern Afghanistan to Iran for transit, given the fragile situation in the south.
investment incentives for Central Asia, particularly by further engaging China in Iran’s logistical infrastructure, should be provided so as to gradually normalize conditions.
Cooperation with Russia and strengthening Russian approaches to Iranian transit should be on the agenda. In this regard, strengthening logistical interactions with Russia by demonstrating pragmatism in the North-South Corridor can be very effective. This should include introducing new initiatives such as linking the corridor to the Arctic via Central Asia, as well as showcasing key developments in Chabahar’s infrastructure.