Introduction
The C5+1 political mechanism between the United States and Central Asia, modeled after Japan’s initiative, was launched for the first time in 2015 and has now reached its tenth anniversary with the recent summit held at the leaders’ level in Washington. This summit was, in fact, the most important and largest meeting in the history of U.S.–Central Asia relations. While the first leaders’ meeting of this mechanism took place in 2023 on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly in New York, the independent hosting of this summit in Washington at the invitation of President Trump represents a significant level of upgrade.
Another important point regarding this summit is that it took place shortly after a similar meeting held in Dushanbe, which involved Russia and was attended by Vladimir Putin. Simultaneously, just before this summit, the long-stalled process in the U.S. Congress for reviewing the removal of restrictions under the Jackson–Vanik Amendment was revived. This clearly reflects Trump’s political play with a somewhat clichéd tool. Although the amendment had been repealed for Russia in 2012, it remained in effect for Central Asian states for unclear reasons.
At the end of the summit, Uzbekistan proposed hosting this forum in Samarkand in 2026—an event that may even take place with the presence of the U.S. president in the region. Mirziyoyev also proposed expanding the C5+1 mechanism through the establishment of a secretariat, a coordinating council of ministers, and a joint investment fund.
The summit produced several major agreements, including: a U.S. investment participation of $1.1 billion in tungsten extraction in Kazakhstan; a major Boeing sales agreement with Uzbekistan; Starlink integration with Veon’s networks and cooperation with Beeline mobile network operator in Kazakhstan; a $2.5 billion investment agreement with a U.S. company in agricultural and construction machinery; the signing of eight agreements with Uzbekistan in geology, agriculture, and water; and several additional agreements with Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan. 

Central Asia’s play with President Trump’s Political Psychology
One of the most important features distinguishing this summit from earlier C5+1 meetings was the behavioral differences displayed by the Central Asian leaders. With a precise understanding of Trump’s political psychology, the leaders of the region established a form of political division of labor between Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. While Mirziyoyev focused primarily on Trump’s economic instincts, Tokayev concentrated on his personality cult and political worldview. This behavioral model, based on political rhetoric, demonstrates the region’s precise awareness of its relations with Trump and its special emphasis on this summit.
On November 3, just days before the meeting, the president of Uzbekistan issued an official decree granting visa-free entry for U.S. citizens starting January 1, 2026, signaling a positive message ahead of his visit to Washington. During his meeting with Trump, Mirziyoyev announced Uzbekistan’s plan to invest $35 billion in the United States over three years and $100 billion over ten years. This appears unrealistic given that Uzbekistan’s GDP in 2024 totaled $114 billion, meaning that an annual investment of roughly $10 billion would require allocating 9% of total GDP to investments in the U.S.—an effectively impossible scenario. Even in the country's domestic infrastructure, such investment levels would be extremely difficult and unattainable for the Uzbek government.
Moreover, Uzbekistan’s rapidly increasing external debt—reaching $72 billion in the first half of 2025 (a 70% increase compared to 2020)—further limits its investment capacity. Another noteworthy issue is Uzbekistan’s $8.5 billion agreement to purchase 22 Boeing 787 Dreamliners—an aircraft affected by recurring severe technical issues and one that was even temporarily grounded in the U.S. Such challenges significantly boosted Boeing’s European rival, Airbus, in the global market. This deal, although relatively small, may help partially revive Boeing’s global market share. Some American sources reported that Central Asian countries collectively ordered 40 Boeing aircraft at the summit.
Tokayev, in his meeting with Trump, called him a great statesman with global support who had ended eight wars in eight months. He also emphasized that Trump had restored common sense and traditional values to American foreign policy. Tokayev was also the only Central Asian president who spoke with Trump in English without an interpreter. Meanwhile, Mirziyoyev and Berdimuhamedow, in an unusual move, chose to speak Russian, and the presidents of Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan spoke in their native languages.
Kazakhstan also made a significant move by agreeing to join the Abraham Accords during the summit—allowing Trump to declare Kazakhstan the first country to join the accords during his second presidential term. This is especially important to Trump’s personal political worldview and his so-called “peace-making” policies.

U.S. Objectives and Plans
The United States pursued several strategic objectives during the summit. The foremost goal was securing stable supplies of rare earth elements. Trump explicitly stated at the beginning of his remarks that critical minerals were at the top of the agenda. For the U.S., Central Asia represents a valuable potential alternative—particularly in the absence of China, and amid Washington’s weakened position in Africa, tensions with Canada, and challenges related to Greenland.
Accordingly, one of the summit’s most important achievements was signing a cooperation agreement on the extraction of rare earth elements between the regional states and the United States. In this framework, agreements were reached with Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and Tajikistan. If implemented, these initiatives would reduce U.S. dependence on China and Russia and maintain the growth trajectory of major global technology companies. This also provides the U.S. with notable influence in Central Asia’s mining sector. Tokayev stated that U.S. investment in Kazakhstan exceeds $100 billion, placing America at the top of foreign investors.
The second major objective— that has a significant impact at the strategic and political level —is strengthening Central Asia’s position in U.S. foreign policy. At the C5+1 foreign ministers’ meeting, U.S. Secretary of State Rubio bluntly said that the United States had previously neglected Central Asia and was now seeking to correct this. Trump, too, stressed that previous U.S. presidents had ignored Central Asia’s potential. Despite the growing C5+1 mechanism development, the 2023 leaders’ meeting in New York was reportedly held reluctantly by President Biden and only due to persistent requests from Central Asian countries.
However, the recent summit was initiated by the White House—signaling a substantial shift in U.S. policy. This could become a major driver of U.S.–Central Asia relations and provoke heightened sensitivity from other regional players, especially Russia and China. Rubio also stated that he intends to visit all five Central Asian countries soon—potentially laying the groundwork for a future Trump visit to the region.
Meanwhile, extensive speculation in U.S. think tanks and some Russian media has emerged regarding possible discussions on U.S. military basing in Central Asia, though no official details have been released. The essence of this plan is a formal or informal U.S. deployment in Central Asia in order to pressure Moscow and Beijing, particularly in support of potential future operations in Afghanistan. Given that both U.S. think tanks and the Trump administration view the withdrawal from Bagram as a grave mistake, Central Asian cooperation could be crucial for enabling a return.
The region’s close ties with the Taliban and its intelligence and operational access inside Afghanistan enhance this possibility. Previously, CENTCOM had utilized Central Asia for HUMINT-based operations (human intelligence collection). Central Asia—particularly Tajikistan or Uzbekistan—remains the primary alternative location for U.S. basing, if re-entry into Afghanistan remains unfeasible. Some experts argue that even re-establishing a base in Afghanistan would still require Central Asian support. It seems that the groundwork for such cooperation is developing under the U.S. National Guard partnership program in Central Asian countries: Kazakhstan with Arizona National Guard, Kyrgyzstan with Montana, Tajikistan with Virginia, Uzbekistan with Mississippi, and Turkmenistan with Nevada. Expanding these partnerships may pave the way for formal or informal U.S. basing in the region.
The third Trump objective related to the Abraham Accords and Israel, in line with his international policy views. During the summit, Kazakhstan’s accession to the accords was officially announced by Tokayev and Trump, accompanied by a joint phone call with Netanyahu. This was surprising, as Azerbaijan—Israel’s strategic partner—was widely expected to join before any Central Asian state. Tokayev adopted a cautious tone, emphasizing that membership in the accords would not affect Kazakhstan’s bilateral commitments to any country and that it represented a natural extension of Kazakhstan’s multilateral diplomacy in support of global peace and security.
Nevertheless, Hamas swiftly condemned Kazakhstan’s accession; Continuing such positions in the Islamic world could have political costs for Kazakhstan. Kazakhstan, however, appears fully aware of such consequences and accepted the membership based on analyses of Trump’s political psychology as well as American political pressure. In practice, however, membership in the accords seems unlikely to bring benefits other than reducing the cost of accession for other states as well as offering some limited political gains to Kazakhstan.
This comes while Kazakhstan's relations with the Zionist regime are at a relatively high level, and have even expanded in recent years despite Israel’s genocide in Gaza.
In addition, the United States pursues lower-priority goals. One of these is competition with Europe. Washington seeks to ensure that any strategic engagement between Central Asia and Europe remains dependent on the United States, effectively limiting European companies’ access to Central Asia’s critical resources. U.S. reactions in the mining sector have been particularly strong. Furthermore, Trump appears interested in expanding the vision of the Greater Central Asia. This could involve expanding the current C5+1 political mechanism to 1+6 or 2+5 with the inclusion of Azerbaijan. Azerbaijan’s key role in encouraging Kazakhstan to join the Abraham Accords, along with Baku’s increasingly divergent views toward Moscow, are important factors that have made the United States interested in fostering the political alignment between Azerbaijan and Central Asia.

Challenges and Divisions Ahead
Despite the United States’ renewed and upgraded approach—along with Central Asia’s particular focus on expanding relations—there remain several challenges that will complicate the implementation of agreements. The first and most important issue is the Ukraine crisis. Shortly before the summit, Ukraine once again launched attacks on Kazakhstan’s oil-transport infrastructure in Russia, further disrupting Kazakhstan’s energy exports—exports that are, interestingly, carried out by major American companies such as Chevron. Although the two sides agreed during the meeting to expand oil and gas production in fields such as Tengiz and Karachaganak, challenges relating to energy exports remain unresolved. Kazakhstan’s entry into the global oil market cycle is extremely important for the United States, given Washington’s policy of lowering global oil prices in the event of intensified tensions with Iran and Venezuela.
Alongside this, one must note that the United States is not, in practical terms, a significant economic actor in Central Asia. In 2024, total U.S. trade with Central Asia amounted to just $4.9 billion, more than 85 percent of which was with Kazakhstan alone. This figure is even lower than China’s trade with smaller states such as Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan.
For this reason, the United States seeks to construct economic leverage in the region; however, given that direct trade is neither economical nor feasible, Washington is attempting to achieve this leverage using the region’s own resources through political mechanisms. Washington fully understands that sanctions and economic pressure alone are ineffective and cannot easily deter Central Asia from utilizing resources offered by other partners. At the same time, U.S. leverage for investment in the region is more limited than in the past.
On the other hand, a serious political fear in Central Asia remains one of the obstacles and pushback factors in these interactions. This fear manifests at two levels. The first concerns the use of Central Asian states as a playing field against China, Russia, Iran, and even Afghanistan—an issue that deeply worries these states, especially given Trump’s unpredictable behavior. The second level concerns U.S. interference in domestic affairs and the exacerbation of political unrest in these countries—examples of which can be found in the events in Kyrgyzstan in October 2020, the Karakalpakstan unrest in Uzbekistan in 2022, and the January 2022 turmoil in Kazakhstan.
It appears that Trump is presenting certain convergent approaches to reduce these concerns. One such model was previously applied to Turkmenistan (involving the cessation of U.S. pressure on methane-gas leakage issues, the halting of opposition activity in the U.S., and the reduction of human-rights criticism, in exchange for some informal economic and possibly political-security concessions). This model is considered one of the successful precedents. Meanwhile, the U.S. government and even American media showed no reaction to the open letter from Tajik opposition groups—such as the Movement for Reforms and Development of Tajikistan—calling for discussion of political prisoners during Trump’s meeting with Emomali Rahmon. This indicates that Trump continues to adopt a convergent approach in this regard. Nonetheless, there is no guarantee that the broader U.S. government and security establishment will follow this approach.

Conclusion
The inescapable reality following the C5+1 leaders’ summit is that the level of relations between the United States and Central Asia has been upgraded. Yet the other side of this reality is that, despite the upgrade, no fundamental change will occur in the balance of power in Central Asia; rather, the increasing trend of U.S. influence and focus in the region will continue and even strengthen.
At the same time, it appears that the United States is likely to unveil a new strategy soon. Trump’s previous strategy for 2019–2025 centered on Afghanistan prior to the Taliban’s return to power, but the new strategy will likely be more aggressive in certain political areas and more pragmatic in economic matters. This strategy may gradually influence relations between Iran and Central Asia as well. U.S. mediation to integrate these countries into the Abraham Accords—which could deepen their strategic partnerships with Israel—is one such area. The emergence of a strategic calculation among these states that such divergent approaches toward Iran—as a neighboring country—are low-cost or even cost-free is a critical issue that could lead to the continuation or repetition of the positions taken by these states (except Tajikistan) during the 12-day war.
It is expected that, given such trends, the Islamic Republic of Iran will also expand its engagement with Central Asia at a higher level. The upcoming visit of Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian to Kazakhstan could serve as an important starting point for this balancing approach and for moderating Central Asian behavior within the framework of these states’ multilateral foreign-policy orientation.